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AN ACT 
Chcp!or No. 
114 
Creating a code revision conm1iosion; and providing fer an effec­
tive date. 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGIStATU::lE OF THE STATE OF ALASKA: 
* Section 1, AS 24,20 is amended by adding a new section to
read: 
Sec. 2�.20.075, ALASKA CODS COMMISSION. (a) The Code 
novision Commission is estnbli:;hed as a permanent commission 
of the Jecislature. 
(b) The commission consists of two legislators, one
fro:n each house, appointed by the pre:;idine officer; on1;> 
puhU c member <lppointcct by the gover11or; a de::iignr.c of th1;> 
chic!' ju:;l,lce or- the s11prcme court; ,in<.1 a dc:iicnce of the 
,Uo.Jl<o. nor A!.lsociation appointed by the board of governors 
or the a:i:.iociation. Legislative mc•mber:i serve :it the plc·a­
surc of the preoldlng ofriccr, and appointed members s�rve 
at the pleasure of the appointing authority, Mcmbcr:.i re­
c0ive the standar<.1 per diem for board· members, or tht' regu­
lar le1.ci:;lutive per dic!:t if tlt1;>y <ll'C leiislaton;, for days 
q,c·nt on commission busines3, The commission 3elect-s it:; 
chairman and vice-chat�1an, The director of lc�al cervices 
for the Leci2la\:.lv.-, Affniro Ag,,ncy,_ or his dc:1icneo, Gerves 
u:; executive sec1•etar·y fer the comm13:;iion, 
(c) The commicoion shall
(1) examine the ntotutcs or the state nnd judi­
cial decisions to discover defoots Rnd anachronism3 in the 
law; 
(2) review nnd consider proposed changes in the
law recommended by the National Law Institute the N::.tional 
Conference of Cbmmiosion•?!'S on lin11'orm $\;ate L:.iws, tll<: 
Ala3ka Judicial Council, the suprome court, the state or 
local bar asGociations, principal departments, agencies, 
boords end co��icsiono or the executive or judicial branch, 
nnd committees or tho_ lceislntive branch; 
(3) receive and consid�r sueccotions from tho
Alanko �ench and bar, public bfficialc, orgo.niintionc, and 
1nd1viduolo as to areas or law needing review and remedy; 
(4) rcbon�cnd chanGCS in law needed to eliminate
antiquated and inadequate ruleo of law a11d to brine; tho law 
into harmony with current needs and conctitions, 
l .
(d) The commission may
(1) hold public hcaring3 and other meetings as
necessary throughout the state and shall determine an appro­
priate quorum for conducting business; 
(2) establish one or more subcommissions to
assist it in the perform&nce of its duties. 
(e) The staff of the Legislative Affnir3 Agency serves
as staff for the cor:unission. Subject to c.ppropriation for 
the purpose, the eo11\J71ission may req�.est the agency to cor,­
tract with other agencies or persons for the-performance of 
necessary services. 
(f') The commission shall submit its reports ond rocom­
r:wndatJons, nnd rlraft lor;islation os t.o rcvicir.11 of J.a.w, - to 
the Legislative Council and shall dintribute them to the 
governor, mcmbr,rs of the legisl<4turs, ancl the chief justice 
of th� supreme court, 
(g) All branchen of ntate �ovornmcnt shall provide
information and cto,:uments requested by the comrr.ission nece3-
sary to the accomplishment of its work. 
(h) The C•)r..Tl.ssion shal:!. r:iakc a for1',2,1 rcquc,:-t to the
legiclativ0 council for fund:: it considers n0aess�ry for the 
pc.r dier:i, trav-=-1, and contractual expenses of the com:r.i::,ion, 
Funds appropriated, to t:1e ·com:;;ission arc to be di:ibvn:cd and 
accounted for und�r procedures �equired by the Legislative 
Affairs Ae;:>.ncy. 1'he c,,mmiz::::l.on oha.ir1;1t,n shall appro·;e f,11 
expenditure dccumcntc. 
* Sec. 2, CRIMD:AL LAW P.EVISION St:BCOMMI33ION. �a) '1'l1c:;re is
e::;tabli:e;J:ed as a suocc�nnis3ion of the Code Revision Co:n.�i;rnion 
the Criminal Law Revision Su1.,cor.u11isr,ion. 
(b) The sutcom.11ission e::tablishod in (a) of tr.is section is
::omposed of the fcllowi:15 
(1) ·cho ch11ir1�a11 of the judiciary COll'JTJit'.;cc of tl:e
state housE of representatives or his dcsignec from that com­
mittee and the chc.irmc.n of the judiciary c0rnmittec of the ·stc.tc 
senate or his desienee from that r,cm:nittec; 
nee; 
(2) the attorney General, or his dcsienee;
( 3) the commicsioner of public ::iafety, or his· desig-
(�) the dlrector of the divlaion of corrections, 
Department of Health and Social Services, or his designee; 
(5) a judge of the superior ccurt appointed by the
chief justice; 
(6) a judge of the district cuurt appointed by the
chief justice; 
(7) the public defender, er his designee;
{ 8) one lf,2.yor or r.is deslgnc-e, from a :;;unlcipality, 
designated by the council; 
(9) one person, rcprtsentativc of rural Alaska, desig­
nated by the council; 
(10) two attorneys expcricn�ed in the practice of
criminal law appointed by the Board of Gov�rnors of the Alaska 
Bar Association; 
(11) two representatives of the coneral public appoin­
ted ty the Legislative Council. 
(c) An appcinting autl1ority o� a dc�j-�nated m��ber_0f t�ecubcorr�t,issivn IT;ay na.rne a.:1 alternate lo �e!"IC in r.is stea.o when 
the member is unable to atte�d a meeting 
(d) 1-kr,cer!: of the zubcoJ":".r;.icsior. e:..t;.hl'..::;hecl in (o) of this
:::cction ::0rve ex ofrlclc, .:,r at tl,c plc;,s·,.1.'•� of t,he nr,j)olnling 
&utllority. 
ll . 
(e) Public J11cr.1h,�rs 1·cc�ive no sa12.ry b-..:t are cr.1.,itled to
per dit� �nd travel expenses �uthorized by law fer other boards 
and ,:c,1:--.1r,issj ona. 
(f) ':'he subccmrnission s!,all
(1) adviGc ttc eovcrnor and the legislal�re, through
t:,c 1:c<lc �evision Corr.mi:,r-.1on, en necessary a1,d ::ipi.:r,·pri,'lte l'e­
•, isicn of toe: cri:nin2..l luh·; 
(2) prepal'e a cumprchensive revision of the state
criminRl laws includinG but not limited to nrcessary substa�tive 
and topical revisic�c of cr1rnca, criminal procedure, sentencjng, 
Qnd �arole and pro�ation cf offenders, for submission to the 
lr•e:isla'c;,,irc; 
13) conduct studies cf criminal Justice practices an�
11rccedures; 
(4) suhj�ct to approval of the Code Revision Com­
rr.i:�� 0n, rcc,.�iv� a�d expend r,:i1 ::,.nt� and approprie.t!on5 from fH'i•• 
·,ate and f.OVcernw:::t:cl :::c.;rc,n :or the r,uri::cse cf carryine, out J.tc
:!t:t:i,::: unde:r thi:::. �cct.i0n;
(5) request the Legislative Affairs Agency, through
the Code Revision Commission, to conLract with other a[onciez or 
J:-!'r:cns f'or t,1c pe.•fcrmo.nce cf r.ccess,,ry services; 
(6) ::;ubralt a report with recommendations and draft
lcglnlaticn through the C0do Rev1310n Commission tc the council 
concerning :iubstant1.ve 01• topical rcv1:;1tJns. to the crim1.11ul laws 
be fore Dccer�ber 1, 1977. 
(g) 'r'he flllbcom:nizflion shall select a chai.rnw.n und vice­
chn1rrr.an from a:nong its members. 
(h) Tl\P. subcommission r.:::iy hold public hearings and other
mc<a>ting:; as r.ccesi:ary throur.;hout the state and_ :.:hall determine an 
appropriate quorum for coruluctin� bunine::;s. 
* Sec. 3, The su�commission cstnbHshed by sec. 2 of this Act
expire� January 15, 1978, 
* Sec. 4. Thie Act takes effect immediately in accordance
with AS 01.10.07o(c). 
Approved by governor: 
Actual effective date: 
June 3, 1976 
June 4 _, 1976 
iii.
Pursuant to this statute, the Criminal Law 
Revision Subcommission was established with a membership 
as follows: 
The Chairman of the Judiciary Com.mittee of the House 
Representative Terry Gardiner 
The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate 
Senator Robert H. Ziegler, Jr. or his designees, 
Senator Patrick Rodey 
John Abbott, Attorney-at-Law 
The Attorney General 
Honorable Avrum Gross or his designee 
Daniel W. Hickey, Chief Prosecutor 
The Commissioner of Public Safety 
Richard Burton or his designee, 
Colonel Pat Wellington 
The Director of the Division of Corrections, Department 
of Health and Social Services 
William Huston or his designee 
Walt Jones 
A Judge of the Superior Court 
Honorable Ralph Moody 
A Judge of the District Court 
Honorable Laurel Peterson 
The Public Defender 
Honorable Brian Shortell or his designee, 
Beverly Cutler, Assistant Public Defender 
iv.
A Designee of a Municipality 
Honorable Rick Garnett, City Attorney, Anchorage or 
his designee 
Steven Dunning, Assistant City Attorney 
A Representative of Rural Alaska 
Honorable Nora Guinn 
Two Attorneys representing the Alaska Bar Association 
William Fuld, Attorney-at-Law and 
Bruce Bookman, Attorney-at-Law or their designee, 
Doug Pope, Attorney-at-Law 
Two Representatives of the General Public 
Pam McMillan, ACSW or her designee, 
John Pugh and 
George Ed. Smith 
Staff Support: 
John Havelock 
Barry Jeffrey Stern 
Peter Ring 
Jim Peterson 
Scott Decker 
Phyl Booth 
Margie Yanagawa 
v._ 
Project Executive Director 
Reporter/Staff Counsel 
Research Director 
Research Assistant 
September, 1976 - present 
Research Assistant 
Summer, 1976 
Administrative Secretary 
Secretary 
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2.
WHY A REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Criminal Code Revision Commission was created on 
February 12, 1975 by a resolution of both houses of the 
Legislature. That resolution set forth the reasons for 
creating the Commission. 
WHEREAS the criminal code of the State of 
Alaska represents a considerable and vital body 
of law which has not undergone substantive 
revision and is consequently vastly out of step 
with constitutional and social developments of 
recent decades; and 
WHEREAS, each year since 1965, a revised 
criminal code for the state has been before the 
legislature but has failed to garner the neces­
sary support for passage; and 
WHEREAS, once again, a criminal code revision 
which could serve as a basis for study by persons 
knowledgeable in the varying aspects of the 
criminal law is contained in the proposed legis­
lation; and 
WHEREAS it is impossible during the course 
of a legislative session to devote the necessary 
man-hours required to refine and digest the 
proposed revision and to have the necessary 
expertise available to review the proposal; 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Alaska State Legislature 
that the Legislative Council in cooperation with 
the Attorney General is requested to form a "blue 
ribbon'' commission to study, refine,. and to submit 
to the Second Session of the Ninth Legislature a 
revision of the proposed code the commission 
recommends be favorably acted upon; 
Senate Concurrent Resolution# 5 am H 
9th Legislature, 1st session 
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Recognizing that the need for revision in the law went 
beyond the Criminal Code, in 1976 the legislature established 
a permanent Alaska Code Commission and revstablished the 
Criminal Code Revision Com.mission as a Subcommission of the 
Code Commission. Once again the mandate of the Subcommission 
was made clear. By December 1, 19 7 7, it ',vas to "p:r�epar:e a 
comprehensive revision of the state criminal laws. II 
In establishing the Criminal Code Revision Commission, 
the Legislature followed a pattern set by some 42 other states 
which have enacted or are considering completely revised 
criminal codes. The most recent and the most widely respected 
revisions, especially those of Oregon, New York, Arizona, 
Michigan, Illinois and Missouri, were the principal sources of 
the original drafts considered by the Subcommission. These 
original drafts were then refined and redone many times over 
to cover problems which are unique to Al,:1ska or which have 
arisen under the revised codes of other states. The tentative 
drafts of February - April, 1977, represent literally thousands 
of man-hours of effort by legislators, judges, prosecutors, 
public defenders, other attorneys, peace officers, corrections 
officers, social workers, professors of law, full-time staff, 
and ordinary citizens. 
The Subcommission has now completed drafts on approxi­
mately 75% of a finished code. Completed drafts of crimes 
4 . 
against the person (murder, assault, kidnapping, sexual offenses 
and robbery), crimes against.property (theft, forgery, 
arson and burglary) and general provisions (culpability, 
justification, accomplice liability, attempt and related 
offenses and general definitions) will be submitted in bill form 
with Commentary to the Legislature in early February. The 
Subcommission does not expect to submit a fully complete code 
until December, 1977. However, submission of the work already 
completed this session will insure adequate time for Judiciary 
Committee and public hearings to allow for passage of the 
completed Code during the 1978 legislative session. 
While there have been disagreements among the various 
groups represented on the Subcommission over specific sections 
of the Revised Code, the overall structural reform has the 
approval of the entire Subcommission and a consensus was 
reached on virtually all specific statutory provisions. 
Passage of a Revised Code will naturally require that an 
education program be developed for attorneys, judges, peace 
officers and correctional officers to enable all segments of 
the criminal justice system to become acquainted with the new 
law. However, experience in the 29 states which are now 
functioning under similar recently revised codes has indicated 
that the transition to a revised code can be accomplished 
within a year after its passage. The experiences of other 
states also strongly suggest that the passage of a revised 
5 . 
criminal code does not create any more appeals seeking 
clarification of the law than does reliance on old statutes. 
I. Total Revision vs. Piecemeal Amendment
The main accomplishment of the Subcommission will be 
the redrafting of all the criminal law to assure consistency 
in language and penalty structure. The Alaska Criminal Code 
has never had such a revision. 
In passing the Alaska Government Act of 1884 Congress 
provided that the general laws of Oregon would apply to Alaska. 
In 1899, Congress approved a criminal code for Alaska which 
again was based mostly on Oregon law. Many of these century­
old Oregon criminal statutes are still on the books even 
though the Oregon Criminal Code itself was comprehensively 
revised in 1973. 
Over the past seventy years, Alaskan territorial and 
state legislatures have added new statutes or amended old 
sections according to the inspiration of individual legis­
lators, reacting to the atmospheres of different times until 
today Alaska's criminal statutes are filled with obsolete 
language, needless distinctions, inconsistent provisions and 
outdated concepts. While Alaska's criminal statutes are 
still, for the most part, workable, they a:ce difficult to 
6.
understand and are marred by loopholes. A complete revision 
of the criminal code is necessary because the piecemeal 
approach followed over the past seventy-five years has 
failed. 
One of the most flagrant examples of the consequences 
of a piecemeal approach to revision is the bewildering 
variety of mental states which the state must prove to 
convict under existing statutes. Existing law uses at 
least twenty different mental states, some of which have 
been found through the appellate process to be identical in 
meaning, to define crimes. They range from "knowingly", 
"surreptitiously" and "maliciously" to "purposely and deliberately", 
"wilfully and wrongfully", "maliciously or wantonly" and "wilfully 
and deliberately". The Revised Code simply assigns one of four 
clearly defined mental states (intentional, knowing, reckless 
and criminal negligence) to each crime, thus greatly simplifying 
what the U. S. Supreme Court has described as "one of the most 
elusive elements in criminal law". 
The piecemeal amendment approach has also resulted in 
the continued use of antiquated language which originated in 
English Common Law hundreds of years ago. Terms like "malice", 
"premeditation" and "assault" have been argued over 
and interpreted so much through the years that their effective 
meaning is really understood only by a small group of criminal 
law specialists. Peace officers generally know the law relating 
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to the crimes most often encountered, but the average person 
has to get legal advice in order to understand the laws by 
which he is expected to govern his conduct. Under the Revised 
Code, if a person intentionally kills another person, without 
excuse, justification or mitigating factors, he is guilty of 
murder. There is no need to complicate and confuse the issue by 
arguing over what English judges 300 years ago thought "malice" 
meant to them. 
Another pernicious result of piecemeal amendment is a 
great number of overly specific crimes with inconsistent 
penalty provisions. For example, the minimum penalty for 
burglary in a dwelling is less than the minimum penalty for 
burglary not in a dwelling. Perjury occurring in a criminal 
case where the defendant faces a possible life sentence has a 
smaller minimum sentence than perjury occurring in a civil 
case. The maximum penalty for forging a bill of lading is 
twenty years while the maximum penalty for aggravated assault 
is only five. 
Offenses in the Revised Code are gra0ed for sentencins
purposes by labeling each offense as a Class A, B, or C felony
or a Class A or B misdemeanor. These classes of offenses will
apply to a general sentencing schedule at the beginning of the
' 1 th "B" Code with an "A" offense punished rnor-e severe y an a oi:-
"C" offense. This system helps eliminate the possibly unintended
disparity in penalties attached to similar crimes.
8 
Revising the whole Code at once has the additional 
benefit of plugging loopholes that have resulted from the 
Legislature's responses to specific problems as they arose. 
For example, AS 11.30.215, 11.45.050 and 11.45.055 prohibit 
false reports of crimes, fires, need for an ambulance and 
bombs, but do not prohibit false reports of other emergencies 
to the police. The Revised Code will close this loophole. 
Similarly, theft has been divided up over the years into 
a dozen categories according to the place the property was 
located, the type and value of the property stolen, the time 
of day it was stolen, the class of person stealing and the 
method used to steal. A variance between an indictment 
claiming one method of stealing and evidence at trial showing 
a slightly different method may result in the offender's 
escaping conviction. 
To close this loophole, the Subcor.unission has adopted 
a consolidated theft statute which has abolished the highly 
technical distinctions among the various larceny-type 
offenses. Under the Revised Code a charge of theft will be 
sufficient without designating the particular manner of stealing, 
except for theft by extortion. 
Finally, rewriting the Criminal Code in fewer, simpler 
terms, and using those terms consistently, will make the 
Revised Code easier to learn, understand and use for all who 
come into contact with it - police, cor�ections officers, 
j11dges, prosecutors, defense at�orneys an� the seneral public. 
9.
This is especially true with respect to prosecutors and 
public defenders, who do most of the criminal trial work in 
Alaska but rarely remain in their positions for more than 
three years. Most of these attorneys, and virtually all 
of those who will fill the positions as they become open, 
were taught criminal law according to the principles 
appearing in recently revised codes. It thus becomes more 
difficult and time-consuming for each new prosecutor or 
public defender to master the intricacies of the Alaska 
Statutes. Judges, defendants, and the public will all 
benefit from any changes that will enable the attorneys on 
the firing line to spend more of their time preparing cases 
and less time trying to find and understand the law. 
II. Substantive Changes
The primary aim of the Revised Code is to eliminate 
the structural defects in existing law. As a secondary 
goal, the Subcornrnission has cautiously updated a few areas 
of the criminal code to reflect changing community attitudes 
and needs. The Subcornrnission has not proposed any substantive 
changes in areas which the Legislature has recently updated 
itself� such as the insanity defense and abortion. 
The Revised Code does away with some statutes which reach 
10.
conduct that was a major problem long ago, but can now be 
included in broader statutes. Dueling, adulterating gold 
dust, and driving animals from the range are examples of 
criminal conduct which no longer require individual statutes. 
In furtherance of the goal of establishing the Criminal 
Code as the principal source of criminal law, the Revised 
Code recognizes in statutes several doctrines which can now 
only be found by examining case law. For example, specific 
guidelines are set forth describing the amount of force 
justified in defense of self, others, homes and personal 
property. 
In one of its most substantial reforms, the Revised 
Code fulfills the need for a new homicide statute. The 
litigation-spawning concept of malice aforethought is 
abandoned in favor of the clearly defined states of mind 
used throughout the Revised Code. The rule that murder is 
reduced to manslaughter by a showing of serious provocation 
was codified and limited in accordance with case law. Finally, 
the existing felony murder statute, which is peculiar to 
Alaska, was rewritten so as to conform with the experience 
of most states. 
III. CONCLUSION
Alaska needs a Revised Criminal Code. The Legislature, 
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recognizing this need, has attempted in every session for the 
past eleven years to pass a new code. Those attempts have 
failed because the time limitations on legislators during the 
session make it impossible for them to read, understand, 
discuss and offer thoughtful amendments to such a Code while 
handling other pressing legislative business. This year, 
much of the necessary amending and discussing has been done 
by groups concerned with the administration of criminal law 
before the bill is introduced. There is no doubt that the 
Revised Criminal Code is an improvement over existing law. 
While nobody will agree with every individual section, the 
people of Alaska will benefit when the Revised Criminal Code 
is passed. 
It is expected that some resistance to the Revised 
Criminal Code will come from people whose work has required 
them to become immersed in the complexity of the existing 
statutory system. Those working with the existing statutes 
on a daily basis, being long married to it, tend to overlook 
its defects, particularly those problems which confront 
others working with the law. A problem once hurdled is 
soon forgotten and the general impression left is that a 
statute or two may need amendment but that overall the statutes 
are sound. While workable they are not sound. A critical 
analysis of the existing law, section by section, reveals, 
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time after time, confusion of language or purpose, overbreadth 
or overnarrowness, contradiction and overlap among sections. 
It should be no argument against codification 
that the existing complexity has become manageable to a 
few people experienced in criminal law. Education in the 
unnecessary intricacies of the present law takes time and 
money which is unwarranted regardless of whether the expense 
is borne by taxpayers, lawyers or criminal clients. The 
increased efficiencJ· of administration which will result from 
the adoption of a Revised Criminal Code will benefit both 
the state and the defendant. 
At least 42 states and the federal government are adopting 
or seriously considering criminal codes based on a format 
very similar to Alaska's Revised Code. Within a few years, 
there will be virtually no other courts rendering decisions 
based on old-style codes. Since Alaskan history is short and 
its appellate case load small, we have always relied on 
decisions from other states to fill the gaps in our case law 
which occur simply because the fact patterns have not occurred 
here. This reliance will be rendered increasingly difficult 
the longer we fail to revise our outdated existing criminal 
laws. 
J.3.
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INTRODUCTION TO TENTATIVE DRAFT, PART 1 
Tentative Draft, Part 1 is comprised of four 
articles contained in the Offenses Against the Person 
chapter of the Revised Criminal Code - criminal homicide, 
assault and related offenses, kidnapping and related 
offenses and sexual offenses. This Tentative Draft 
represents a small portion of the work completed by 
the Criminal Code Revision Subcommission in 1976. 
Tentative Draft, Part 2 will be distributed 
in early March. This draft will be comprised of the 
offenses of robbery, bribery and perjury, and articles 
on a number of general provisions, including justification 
and accomplice liability. 
Tentative Draft, Part 3 will be distributed 
in late March and will include articles on theft, burglary, 
arson and forgery. 
Commentary follows each article in the Tenta­
tive Draft and is designed to aid the reader in analyzing 
the effect of the Revised Code on existing law. The 
Commentary also provides a section-by-section analysis 
of each provision of the Revised Code. All references 
in the Commentary to Tentative Draft provisions contain 
the letters TD before the usual AS cite. 
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The Tentative Draft also contains several 
appendixes that will be useful in analyzing the Revised 
Code. 
Appendix I contains general definitions of 
terms used throughout the Code, including definitions 
of the four culpable mental states. Though Commentary 
for these sections is not included in this Tentative 
Draft, the Commentary will be included in Tentative 
Draft, Part 2. 
Appendix II lists the derivations of all 
sections in the Revised Code. 
Appendix III allows the reader to compare the 
provisions of the Revised Code with existing law. 
Appendix IV lists the status of criminal code 
revision in other states. 
Finally, Appendix Vis comprised of an index 
which can be used in locating the page of Commentary 
in which a provision of the Revised Code is discussed. 
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ARTICLE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
SECTION 
100 
llO 
120 
CHAPTER 41. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON. 
Homicide (secs. 11.41.100 - 11.41.130) 
Assault and related offenses (secs. 11.41.200 - 11.41.250) 
Kidnapping and related offenses (secs. 11.41.300 - 11.41.-
370) 
Sexual offenses (secs. 11.41.400 - 11.41.460) 
Robbery (secs. 11.41.500 - 11.41.510) 
ARTICLE 1. HOMICIDE. 
Criminal Homicide 
Murder 
Manslaughter 
130 Criminally Negligent Homicide 
Sec. 11.41.100. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE. (a) A person connnits criminal 
homicide if, without justification or excuse, he intentionally, knowing­
ly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the death of another 
human being. 
(b) For purposes of this section, a person is "alive" if, in the
opinion of a medical doctor who is licensed or exempt from licensing 
under AS 08.64.170, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, 
there is spontaneous respiratory or cardiac function or, in the case 
when respiratory and cardiac functions are maintained by artificial 
means, there is spontaneous brain function. 
(c) In this section
(1) "criminal homicide" means murder, manslaughter, or
criminally negligent homicide; -
(2) "human being" means a person who has been born and was
alive at the time of the criminal act. 
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Sec. 11.41.110. MURDER. 
if 
(a) A person comrnits the crime of murder
(1) with intent to cause the death of another person or
serious physical injury to another person or knowing that his conduct is 
substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury to 
another person, he causes the death of another person; or
(2) he recklessly causes the death of another person under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human 
life; or 
(3) acting either alone or with one or more persons, he
commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree, kidnapping in 
the first degree, sexual assault under sec. 410(a)(l) of this chapter 
or sec. 420(a)(l) of this chapter, burglary in the first degree, escape 
in the first or second degree, or robbery in any degree and, in the 
course of or in furtherance of that crime, or in imrnediate flight from 
that crime, any person causes the death of a person other than one of 
the participants. 
(b) In a prosecution under (a)(l) of this section, it is a defense
that the defendant acted in a heat of passion, before there had been a 
reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool, when the heat of passion 
resulted from a serious provocation by the intended victim. Nothing in 
this subsection precludes a prosecution for or conviction of manslaughte 
or any other crime. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting 
the issue of a defense under this section. 
(c) In a prosecution under (a)(3) of this section, if the defen­
dant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an 
affirmative defense that the defendant 
(1) did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit,
request, connnand, cause or aid in its commission; 
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(2) was not armed with a dangerous instrument or deadly
weapon; 
(3) had no reasonable ground to believe that another partici­
pant was armed with a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon; and 
(4) had no reasonable ground to believe that another partici­
pant intended to engage in conduct likely to result �n death or serious 
physical injury. 
(d) A person may not be convicted of murder under (a)(3) of this
section if the only underlying crime is burglary, the sole purpose of 
the burglary is a criminal homicide, and the person killed is the in­
tended victim of the defendant. However, if the defendant causes the 
death of any other person, the defendant may be convicted under (a)(3) 
of this section. Nothing in this subsection precludes a prosecution for 
or conviction of murder under (a)(l) or (a)(2) of this section or of 
any other crime, including manslaughter or burglary. 
(e) It is a defense to the charge of murder that the defendant's
conduct consisted of aiding, without the use of duress or deception, 
another person to conunit suicide. Nothing contained in this subsection 
shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude conviction 
of, manslaughter or any other crime. The defendant shall have the bur­
den of injecting the issue of a defense under this section. 
(f) In this section
(1) "intended victim" means a person who the defendant was
attempting to kill or to whom the defendant was attempting to cause 
serious physical injury when he caused the death of the person he is 
charged with killing; 
(2) "serious provocation" means conduct which is sufficient
to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person in the actor's 
situation under the circumstances as he reasonably believed them to be; 
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the term does not include mere insulting words, mere insulting gestures, 
or hearsay reports of conduct by the intended victim. 
(g) A person who is guilty of murder, upon conviction, is punish­
able by imprisonment for a specific term not to exceed 99 years. 
Sec. 11.41.120. MANSLAUGHTER. (a) A person commits the crime of
manslaughter when he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes the 
death of another person under circumstances not amounting to murder 
under sec. 110 of this chapter. 
(b) Manslaughter is a class A felony.
Sec. 11.41.130. CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal 
negligence, he causes the death of another person. 
(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a class C felony.
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 41 - Offenses Against the Person 
ARTICLE 1. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the �evised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of Criminal Homicide 
In defining the crimes of murder, manslaughter and 
criminally negligent homicide, the Criminal Homicide Article: 
1. Uses the four culpable mental states defined in
chapter 11 which apply throughout the Revised Code.
Curr�ntly, the following undefined, archaic and
confusing terms are used: "sound memory and
discretion," "purposely . . .  deliberate and pre­
meditated malice," AS 11.15.1010; "maliciously,"
AS 11.15.030; "unlawfully," AS 11.15.040;
"purposely and deliberately," AS 11.15.050 and
"culpable negligence," AS 11.15.080. The absence
of commonly defined culpable mental states in
existing law creates significant problems of
administration. See, Stork v. State, Sup. Ct.
Op . No . 13 6 5 (Fi 1 e No 2 7 0 8) ( 19 7 7) .
2. Eliminates the much-criticized distinction between
first and second degree murder.
3. Repudiates the Gray rule and brings Alaska's felony
murder statute into conformity with the rule in 48
states.
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4. Eliminates overly specific statutes, (AS 11.15.020;
070; 170), which prohibit conduct which can be
adequately covered by more general provisions.
5. Explicitly recognizes the common law doctrine that
an act done with a "depraved heart" is murder even
though the defendant did not specifically intend
to kill.
6. Emphasizes that a criminal homicide occurs only
when the defendant acts with a culpable mental
state and without justification or excuse.
7. Codifies the common law doctrine that a ki.1ling
in the "heat of passion" mitigates murder to
manslaughter.
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11.41.100 - CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
Under present law, homicides can be either cri�inal 
or noncriminal. Noncriminal homicides are those that are 
justifiable or excusable. (See, AS 11.15.090, Justifiable 
homicide by public officer or agent; AS 11.15.100, Justifiable 
homicide; AS 11.15.110, Excusable homicide.) The Revised 
Code specifically recognizes this distinction by providing 
that a homicide is criminal only if it occurs "without 
justification or excuse." 
Subsection (a) provides that criminal homicide 
includes the intentional, knowing or reckless killing of 
another. Criminal homicide may also be committed by 
criminal negligence, but the general definition of "criminal 
negligence" in chapter 11 of the Revised Code [TD AS 11.11.099 (4)], 
emphasizes that "civil" negligence will not constitute criminal 
homicide. Stork v. State, �upra. 
Subsection (c) (1) categorizes criminal homicide as
murder, manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide.
The definition of "alive" in subsection (b) is the 
converse of the definition of "death" appearing in existing 
AS 9.65.120 and is used in defining the term "human being" 
in subsection ( c) ( 2) . 
"Human being" is defined in subsection (c) (2) as
a person who has been born and was alive at the time of
the criminal act and excludes a lawful or unlawful abortion 
from the operation of this article. Abortion is covered by 
AS 11.15.060. While the Revised Code does not change the 
existing Abortion statute, it does recognize that the un­
lawful termination of a pregnancy constitutes an aggravated 
form of assault. In doing so, the Revised Code closes a gap 
in existing law by specifically providing than an assault 
which results in the termination of a pregnancy is a serious 
criminal offense regardless of whether the mother suf£ers other 
physical injury. 
The degree of the assault, as with all other forms 
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of assault, will be determined by the culpable mental state 
of the defendant and the means used to inflict the injury. 
If, for example, the defendant causes the termination of a 
pregnancy by an intentional assault, he is guilty of first 
degree assault, which is classified as seriously as man-
slaughter. However, if the actor's conduct is an " . opera-
tion or procedure to terminate the pregnancy of a nonviable 
fetus", the provisions of the existing abortion statute will 
determine whether such conduct is criminal. 
II. TD AS 11.41.110. MURDER.
A. Existing Law
Existing law recognizes the crimes of first and 
second degree murder. First degree murder, AS 11.15.010 and 
AS 11.15.020, can be committed in three ways. AS 11.15.010 
provides that first degree murder is committed when (1) a person 
"being of sound memory and discretion, purposely, and . . .  of 
deliberate and premeditated malice or by means of poison 
. . .  kills another." First degree murder is also committed 
pursuant to the "felony ·murder" provision of AS 11.15.010, 
when a person "being of sound memory and discretion, purposely 
. in perpetrating or in attempting to perpetrate, rape, 
arson, robbery or burglary kills another." Finally, a person 
commits first degree murder if he causes death by "maliciously" 
obstructing or injuring a railroad or aircraft, AS 11.15.020. 
Though the felony murder rule at common law and in 
24.
48 states is designed to prevent all killings (even accidental 
ones) during the perpetration of specific felonies, it has 
been held that a person cannot be convicted of felony murder 
under the current Alaska statute unless the killing "is 
purposely done." Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (AK 1970). 
Second degree murder, AS 11.15.030, is committed by 
one who "purposefully and maliciously kills another" except as 
provided in the two first degree murder sections, AS 11.15.010 
and .020. 
B. The Code Provision - Relationship to Existing Law
1. Subsection (a) (1) -- Elimination of Distinction between
First and Second Degree Murder
In subsection (a) (1) murder is defined in terms of 
intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another. 
Consistent with common law, murder is defined to include 
situations where the defendant only intends to cause serious 
physical injury but death results. The Revised Code does 
not require the deceased to be the intended victim and 
thus recognizes the common law doctrine of "transferred 
intent." 
The Revised Code recognizes only one degree of 
murder. The chief distinction presently between first and 
second degree murder in Alaska, and in other states which 
make the distinction, is the element of premeditation. 
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The court decisions in Alaska, as well as 
in most other states, have narrowed the factor of pre­
meditation to a distinction without a difference. The 
term has come to mean that any prior design to kill, 
though it is formed only an instant before the act is 
sufficient to constitute premeditation. In Gray, supra 
at 906, the Court held that " . the law does not under-
take to measure in units of time the length of the period 
during which the thought must be pondered before it can 
ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate 
and premeditated . . . It was not the duration of time, but 
rather the extent of the reflection that mattered." 
As noted in the commentary to the New York Revised 
Penal Law, the concept of premeditation is not clear even to 
those well versed in the intricacies of existing law. 
Under [the Gray] formulation -- almost inevitable 
because of the impossibility of a definition based 
upon length of time -- the determination of whether 
premeditation occurred in a particular instance fre­
quently amounted to no more than an exercise in 
semantics, and a jury's decision upon the matter 
turned upon an issue which not even experienced 
at�ornev� truly understood. N.Y� Penal Law§ 125.25, 
commentary (McKinney 1975). 
A more basic objection to breaking murder into 
degrees is the view that no single factor or list of 
factors can satisfactorily form the basis of sentencing 
distinctions. A man who lies in wait to kill his wife's 
lover is probably not as dangerous to society as the man 
who fires a pistol into a crowded room without intending 
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to kill any particular person. Yet the betrayed husband 
is guilty under present law of first degree murder while 
the second actor is guilty, at the most, of second degree 
murder. It seems wiser to charge each simply with murder 
and let the judge treat each man according to his danger­
ousness through imposition of appropriately different sen­
tences. Premeditation and deliberation are relevant to the 
penalty to be imposed and 
of the penalty. 
can be considered in the setting 
2. Subsection (a) (2) -- Recklessly Causing Death Under
Circumstances Manifesting Extreme Indifference to the
Value of Human Life 
Subsection (a) (2) is a modern formulation of 
the common law rule that a killing committed "with a depraved 
heart" constitutes murder even though there was no specific 
intent to kill. An example of conduct falling under this 
subsection is firing a gun into a house where the actor knows 
people are present, without any intent to kill or cause 
serious physical injury but with almost complete indifference 
to whether death results. If the killing was done recklessly, 
but not under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference 
to the value of human life, the defendant is guilty of man­
slaughter. See, § III., infra. 
3. Subsection (a) (3) -- Felony Murder
In considering the Revised Code's approach to the 
felony murder statute, it must be recalled that the purpose 
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of a felony murder rule is to deter all killings during the 
commission of felonies which involve a high potential for 
violence. By holding the felon liable for an unintended 
and even accidental death occurring in the course of or in 
furtherance of the felony, the rule provides a powerful 
incentive not to commit inherently dangerous crimes, or at 
the very least to plan and carry out such crimes with increased 
regard for physical dangers. 
For all practical purposes Alaska does not now 
have a felony murder rule. In Gray, supra at 904, the Supreme 
Court held that an "intent to kill" is a necessary eleP1ent 
of felony murder under existing law. Consequently, an 
accidental killing occurring during the commission of an 
enumerated felony does not render an actor guilty of 
felony murder under the existing statute. 
Subsection (a) (3) specifically eliminates the 
Gray requirement that a felon "purt?osely" kill during the 
commission of an enumerated felony. In doing so, the Revised 
Code brings Alaska's felony murder rule into conformance with 
the rule in 48 states. 
Existing Alaska law lists the crimes of rape, 
arson, robbery and burglary as felonies sufficient to trigger 
the application of the felony murder rule. The felony murder 
provision in subsection (a) (3) of the Revised Code only lists 
those degrees or forms of arson, burglary and sexual assault 
which create a serious risk of violence. Because all degrees 
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of robbery involve the use or threatened use of physical force, 
the commission of any degree of robbery is sufficient to bring 
into play the felony murder rule. 
The Revised Code also expands the existing list of 
enumerated felonies by including kidnapping in the first degree 
and felonious escape since these felonies were viewed as 
involving a high degree of danger to human life. 
Under subsection (a) (3) a felon will be criminally 
liable not only for deaths caused by the participants to the crime, 
but for deaths of non-accomplices caused by anyone. For example, 
if a bystander is killed by a policeman's stray bullet durinq 
a gunfight with bank robbers, the robbers are guilty of murder. 
Finally, suhsection (a) (3) broadens the felony 
murder rule by rendering it applicable not only to a killing 
perpetrated during the commission of the felony, but also 
to one perpetrated during "immediate flight therefrom." 
The latter is as culpable as the former, and this expansion 
should eliminate many technical issues which inevitably 
arise when it is essential to determine whether the under­
lying felony was completed at the time of the death or whether 
it was still in progress. 
4. Defenses to Murder
Having defined the three general categories of 
murder, the Revised Code then lists three defenses to the 
crime. 
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( a) Subsection (b) -- �-Ii 11 ing in the "Heat of Passion"
Mitigates_ Murder to Manslaughter
The first defense is a restatement of the common 
law doctrine of "voluntary manslaughter" which has been 
recognized and codified in most American jurisdictions and 
recognized, but not codified, in Alaska. The doctrine 
provides that murder is reduced to manslaughter by a 
mitigating factor variously terned "heat of passion,." "sudden 
passion," "provocation," and the like. The theory of the 
principle is one of extending a degree of mercy to a 
defendant who, though intending to kill, acted after a 
serious provocation in a heat of passion rather than in "cold 
blood". 
The subsection places the burden of injecting the 
issue of a defense of a "heat of passion" on the defendant 
but leaves the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt 
on the state. This means that if there is no evidence to 
indicate that the defendant acted in a heat of passion, the 
defendant has not succeeded in "injecting the issue" and 
the Court will not inform the jury of the existence of the 
defense. If there is some evidence of "heat of passion", 
the defendant will be convicted of murder only if the state 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not 
committed in the "heat of passion." 
(b) Subsection (c) -- Affir�ative Defense to Felony Murder
Subsection (c) creates an affirmative defense to 
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felony murder which has been recognized in most revised codes. 
In a murder charge arising out of one of the 
felonies enumerated in the felony murder section, this 
subsection establishes a defense if the defendant can 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was 
not alone in the crime, that he did not commit or solicit 
the act of killing, that he was not armed with a deadly 
weapon or dangerous instrument and did not have reason to 
believe a co-felon was so armed, and that he had no reasonable 
ground to believe any other participant in the underlying 
felony intended to engage in conduct likely to result in 
death or serious physical injury. Support for this section 
is found in the Commentary to the New York Revised Penal Law. 
"Finally, . the exception [allows] a 
defendant an opportunity to fight his way 
out of a felony murder charge by persuading 
a jury, by way of affirmative defense, that 
he not only had nothing to do with the killing 
itself but was unarmed and had no idea that any 
of his confederates was armed or intended to en­
gage in any conduct dangerous to life. This 
phase of the provision is based upon the theory 
that the felony murder doctrine, in its rigid 
automatic envelopment of all participants in 
the underlying felony, may be unduly harsh in 
particular instances; and that some cases do 
arise, rare though they may be, where it would 
be just and desirable to allow a non-killer 
defendant of relatively minor culpability a 
chance of extricating himself from liability 
for murder, though not, of course, from 
liability for the underlying felony." NY Penal 
Law§ 125.25, commentary (McKinney 1975). 
It is not anticipated that this defense will often 
be successful. The defendant has the burden of affirmatively 
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asserting the defense and proving each element of it by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
(c) Subsection (d) -- Felony Murder Merger Doctrine
Subsection (d) is based on the "merger doctrine" 
which has been formulated by the California Supreme Court in 
People v. Ireland, 450 P.2d 580 (Cal 1969), People v. Wilson, 
462 P.2d 22 (Cal 1969) and People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793 
( Cal 19 71) . 
In considering the "merger doctrine" it must be 
recalled that the purpose of the felony murder rule is to 
deter unintentional and even accidental killings during the 
commission of certain felonies. One of those felonies is 
burglary in the first degree - unlawfully entering a dwelling 
with intent to commit a crime. If a person commits burglary 
in the first degree by breaking into someone's house with 
intent to kill the occupant, the felony murder rule has 
no deterrent effect. Permitting a conviction for murder 
based on the felony murder rule in these circumstances would 
prevent the jury from considering, for example, whether the 
defendant acted in the "heat of passion", since that doctrine 
is not a mitigating factor for felony murder. Since it is 
intended that the jury consider the issue of whether the 
defendant acted in "heat of passion" in intentional killings 
regardless of whether or not they take place in a dwelling, the 
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California courts do not permit felony murder convictions in 
cases like this one. The felony is said to "merge" with the homi­
cide. Of course, the defendant can be convicted of murder for the 
intentional killing. The effect of the merger doctrine is 
to prohibit a murder conviction merely on proof that the 
defendant committed first degree burglary by entering a 
dwelling with intent to commit a crime. The Subcommission 
adopted subsection (d) to obtain this result. 
(d) Subsection (e) -- Aiding a Suicide
Subsection (e) is consistent with existing Alaska 
law which provides that one who aids or procures another to 
commit "self-murder" is guilty of manslaughter. AS 11.15.050. 
This subsection embodies two purposes. One is to indi­
cate a duty not to knowingly facilitate suicide. The second, and 
perhaps more important, purpose is to make clear that this 
activity is not to be viewed as murder unless the defendant 
uses duress or deception in bringing about the suicidal act. 
III. AS 11.41.120. MANSLAUGHTER
A. The Code Provision -- Relationship to Existing Law
There is presently only one statutory crime of 
manslaughter, although it is defined in four statutes, 
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AS 11.15.040, .050, .070 and .080. 
In accord with recent code revisions and Alaska 
case law, the revised manslaughter statute specifically 
repudiates the doctrine that a homicide is manslaughter if 
it resulted from an unlawful act. Instead, under the Revised 
Code the homicide must occur as a consequence of an intentional, 
knowing or reckless act not amounting to murder, thus encompas­
sing aiding a suicide, a killing committed during a "heat of 
passion" or a death as a result of a reckless act. 
By requiring that the crime of manslaughter be 
committed at least "recklessly," the statute incorporates the 
existing rule that ordinary negligence is not sufficient to 
support a conviction for manslaughter. Stork v. State, supra. 
The definition of "reckless" in TD AS 11.11. 099 (3) requires 
conscious awareness of a risk and disregard of it by the 
defendant rather than inadvertent risk taking as with ''criminal 
negligence". The test for recklessness is subjective rather 
than objective. 
In one situation, however, recklessness does not 
require subjective awareness of risk. In chapter 11, General 
PT.inciples of Criminal Liability, the Revised Code provides 
that "a person who is unaware of a risk of which he would 
have been aware had he not been intoxicated or using drugs 
also acts recklessly with respect to that risk." 
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IV. TD AS 11.41.130. CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
A. The Code Provision -- Relationship to Existing Law
AS 11.14.080, the current negligent homicide statute, 
provides that "every killing of a human being by the culpable 
negligence of another . . .  is manslaughter." While the current 
statute has been interpreted so as to include situations where 
an actor is aware as well as unaware of a risk, De Sacia v. State, 
469 P.2d 369, 371 (AK 1970), the criminally negligent homicide 
statute in the Revised Code covers only situations where the defend-· 
ant was unaware of the risk and classifies that form of
criminal homicide as criminally negligent homicide instead of 
manslaughter. 
Key to this section is the definition of "criminal 
negligence" appearing in TD AS 11. 11. 09 9 ( 4) : 
"Criminal Negligence." A person acts with crirninal 
negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance 
described by a statute defining an offense when he fails 
to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. 
The risk must be of such nature and degree that the 
failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that a reasonable person 
would observe in the situation. 
The basic difference between manslaughter and 
criminally negligent homicide is that in recklessness consti­
tuting manslaughter, a conscious disregard of the risk exists, 
while in criminally negligent homicide the risk is unknowingly dis-
regarded. It is expected that this statute will be used 
primarily to prosecute homicides resulting from criminally 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 
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ARTICLE 2. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES. 
SECTION 
200 Assault in the first degree 
210 Assault in the second degree 
220 Assault in the third degree 
230 Assault in the fourth degree 
240 Simple assault 
250 Reckless endange·rmen t 
Sec. 11.41.200. ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE. 
the crime of assault in the first degree when 
(a) A person commit
(1) with intent to cause physical injury to another person
he causes or attempts to cause physical injury to any person by means 
of a deadly weapon; 
(2) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another
person he causes serious physical injury to any person; or 
(3) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another
person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life. 
(b) Assault in the first degree is a class A felony.
Sec. 11.41.210. ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of assault in the second degree when 
(1) with intent to cause physical injury to another person
he causes or attempts to cause physical injury to any person by means of 
a dangerous instrument; 
(2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person
he causes serious physical injury to any person; 
(3) he recklessly causes physical injury to another person by
means of a deadly weapon; or 
(4) he intentionally places or attempts to place another
36.
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person in fear of irmninent serious physical injury by means of a deadly 
weapon or dangerous instrument. 
(b) Assault in the second degree is a class B felony.
Sec. 11.41.220. ASSAULT IN THE THIRD DEGREE. (a) A person commit
the crime of assault in the third degree when 
(1) with criminal negligence he causes serious physical in­
jury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instru­
ment; or 
(2) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another
person. 
(b) Assault in the third degree is a class C felony.
Sec. 11. 41. 230. ASSAULT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE. (a) A person
commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree when 
(1) with intent to cause physical injury to another person,
he causes physical injury to any person; 
(2) he recklessly causes physical injury to another person;
(3) with criminal negligence he causes physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or 
(4) by word or conduct he intentionally places or attempts
to place another person in fear of irmninent physical injury. 
(b) Assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 11.41.240. SIMPLE ASSAULT. (a) A person corrnnits the crime 
of simple assault when he intentionally touches another person with 
reckless disregard for the offensive, provocative, injurious or insultin 
effect which the act may have on that person. 
(b) Simple assault is a class B misdemeanor.
Sec. 11. 41. 250. RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT. (a) A person corrnnits the
crime of reckless endangerment when he recklessly engages in conduct 
which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another 
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person. 
(b) Reckless endangerment is a class A misdemeanor.
38. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 41 - Offenses Against the Person 
ARTICLE 2. ASSAULT 
COM.�1ENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Lat:J of Assault 
In defining the crimes of assault, simple assault 
and reckless endangerment, the Proposed Assault and Related 
Offenses Article: 
1. Recognizes and defines four degrees of assault
in which the seriousness of the offense is deter­
mined by (a) the defendant's culpable mental state,
(b) the seriousness of the injury inflicted, and
(c) the dangerousness of the means used to commit
the assault. Existing law does not define assault, 
but divides the crime into ten separate statutory offen­
ses, describing at least 28 ways in which assault may 
be committed, each of which embraces some special 
peculiarities of assaultive conduct in terms not 
necessarily related to the other statutes. 
2. Provides that an assault can be accomplished by
criminally negligent conduct. The Revised Code
thus eliminates the anomaly that now exists
whereby criminally negligent conduct which causes
death is punishable as homicide but such conduct
which merely inflicts injury does not constitute
39.
an assault unless it occurs by means of a firearm. 
3. Eliminates the offenses of assault with intent to
rob, rape or kill which are treated as attempted
robbery, attempted rape or attempted murder under
the Revisea Code.
4. Specifically recognizes that placing or
attempting to place another in fear of injury
is an assault, even though there is no present
ability to carry out the threat. Further,
orovides that an assault with a deadly weapon
can be committed with an unloaded firearm.
5. Recognizes that reckless conduct which creates
a substantial risk of serious physical injury
is criminal by itself though no injury occurs.
6. Covers conduct involving offensive touchings
not causing physical injury in the separate
crime of simple assault.
Definitions Applicable to Assault Article 
Key to the assault article of the Revised Code are 
four definitions which appear in the general definition 
section. 
"Dangerous Instrument" means anything that under 
the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be 
used, or threatened to be used is cacable of causing 
death or serious physical injury. 
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"Deadly physical force" means physical force that 
under the circumstances in which it is used is capable 
of causing death or serious physical injury. 
"Deadly weapon" means any firearm, loaded or 
unloaded, or anything designed for and capable of 
causing death or serious physical injury, including 
but not limited to a knife, axe, club, metal knuckles, 
explosive, or any weapon from which a shot 
capable of causing death or serious physical injury 
may be discharged. 
"Physical injury" means physical pain or an 
impairment of physical condition. 
OVE?..VIEt,J OF ASSAULT PROVISIONS IN EXISTING LAW AND ?-EVISED CODE 
Existing Alaska Law 
At common law,· assault was defined either as (.1) an 
offer with force or violence to do a corporal hurt to another 
(attempted battery), or (2) an unlawful act which places 
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate 
battery. Battery was defined as the unlawful application 
of force to the person of another or an offensive touching. 
Both assault and battery were misdemeanors at common law. 
There was no crime of felonious or aggravated battery. 
Mayhem, a common law felony, was defined as "violently 
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depriving another of the use of such of his members as 
may render him less able in fighting either to defend 
himself or to annoy his adversary." 
Existing Alaska statutes dealing with criminal 
assaults do not define the crime but rather provide for 
various types of assaults. The factors which aggravate an 
assault tend to fall into three categories: 
(1) Motivation for the Assault: Assault is now 
frequently aggravated according to the actor's intent in 
committing the assault. 
(a) AS 11.15.160 - assault with intent to kill
or commit rape or robbery (1 - 15 years) 
(b) AS 11.15.150 - shooting, stabbing or cutting
with intent to kill, wound or maim (1 - 20 years) 
(2) Dangerous means, wheth�r or- not resul�ing in injury:
Under present law an assault committed with a dangerous weapon 
carries a higher penalty than assault committed while unarmed: 
(a) AS 11.15.220 - Assault with dangerous weapon
(6 months - 10 years and/or fine of $100 - $1000) 
(b) AS 11.15.190 - Assault while armed (1 - 10
years and/or fine of $100 - $1000) 
(c) AS 11.15.295 - Use of firearms during the
commission of certain crimes, including assault 
(first offense not less than 10 years, second 
offense not less than 25 years). 
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( 3) Serious bodily injury actually inflicted. Assault
is aggravated when serious bodily injury is inflicted: 
(a) AS 11.15.140 - Mayhem (1 - 20 years)
(b) AS 11.15.225 - Aggravated assault causing
"great bodily injury" (6 months - 5 years and/or 
fine $100 - $1000). 
The above three aggravating factors which are now 
recognized in Alaska law have been incorporated into the 
Revised Code and are used with other factors in determining 
the degree of assault. 
Under present law virtually all asssault offenses 
require a general intent to commit a battery. "A general 
intent to do a harm is required and is necessarily included 
within the definition of the term 'assault' but not a 
specific intent to do any particular kind of injury to the 
victim." Herrin v. State, 449 P.2d 674, 677 (AK 1969). Some 
provisions, however, require a "specific intent" to do a 
particular act. See, Hallback v. State, 361 P.2d 336 (AK 1961). 
Finally, Alaska is one of the few jurisdictions 
which provides that an assault by means of an unloaded gun 
is not an assault with a dangerous weapon because there is 
no present ability to carry out the assault. Hobbs v. State 
363 P.2d 357 (AK 1961). 
Revised Code 
As defined by the Revised Code, assault is· primarily 
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the causing of physical injury committed with the particular 
culpable mental state specified in each individual assault 
provision. 
There are three exceptions to this rule. The 
Revised Code differs from most recent revisions, but is con­
sistent with existing law, by not requiring that a defendant 
actually cause physical injury when he intentionally uses a 
deadly weapon or dangerous instruBent against another person. 
Similarly, TD AS 11.41.210(4) and 230(4) do not require 
that physical injury be inflicted if the defendant 
intends to frighten the victim. Finally, simple assault 
requires only an offensive touchina short of physical injury. 
With these three exceptions, conduct which does not cause 
physical injury is treated by the Revised Code as an attempted 
assault. 
The Revised Code defines four degrees of assault 
in addition to simple assault. 
The basic offense is aggravated by the following 
factors which, whether singly or in combination, raise the 
degree of the offense: 
(1) The actor's culpc.1.ble ·'.'1.ental state (e.g., intent
to cause serious physical inju�y); 
(2) The seriousness of the injury actually inflicted;
(_3) The dangerousness or the :neans employed to in.'.':lict 
injury. 
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SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11.41.200. ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE. 
TD AS 11.41.200, which is classified as an A felony, 
is the most serious form of assault. A defendant can coinmit 
first degree assault by any of three methods. 
The first, subsection (1) coincides with existing 
AS 11.15.220, Assault with a Dangerous Neapon and AS 11.15.150, 
Shooting with Intent to Kill, by providing that an assault 
by means of a deadly weapon is treated more severely than 
other forms of assault. The subsection requires that the 
defendant intend to cause physical injury and cause or 
attempt to cause physical injury to any person by means of 
a deadly weapon. 
Subsection (2) also classifies as an assault in the 
first degree conduct in which the defendant, intending 
to cause serious physical injury by any means, causes such 
injury. The subsection corresponds with the existing mayhem 
statute, AS 11.15.140. It also includes conduct now clas­
sified as aggravated assault, AS 11.15.225, except that a 
specific intent to cause serious physical injury must be 
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proved as opposed to the existing requirement of a showing 
of an intent to cause any degree of injury. 
Subsection (3), the final form of first degree 
assault, is especially significant when considered in con­
junction with TD AS 11.41.ll0(a) (2) defining the same conduct 
as murder when death results. The �urder provision applies 
to conduct of extrene depravity, such as throwing a bomb 
into a crowd without any specific homicidal intent. Although 
this may constitute murder under current law in the event 
of a fatality, it does not constitute assault if the result 
was a serious but non-fatal injury. This obvious gap is 
filled by this section which renders the actor guilty of 
assault in the first degree. Upon this subject it is 
pertinent to note that, even though the bomb does not explode, 
the defendant is still guilty of reckless endangerment, 
TD AS 11.41.250, infra. 
II. TD AS 11.41. 2 10. ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
Assault in the second degree is an aggravated form 
of assault and is classified as a Class B felony. While 
assault in the first degree an<l assault in the second degree 
parallel each other in significant ways, certain aggravating 
factors present in the first degree offense are absent in 
this section. Assault in the second degree may be accoQplished 
by any of four methods. 
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Subsection (1) parallels subsection (1) of assault 
in the first degree except that a dangerous instrument is 
used instead of a deadly weapon. Thus, an assault with an 
object designed for causing death or serious physical injury, 
such as a gun, is treated more severely than assault with an 
object that only becomes dangerous because of the manner in 
which it is used, such as a telephone. 
Similarly, subsection (2) parallels subsection (2) 
of the first degree assault statute, except that in committing 
second degree assault the defendant need only intend to cause 
physical injury as opposed to the intent to cause serious 
physical injury. 
Subsection (3) provides that a defendant commits 
second degree assault if he recklessly causes physical injury 
by means of a deadly weapon. 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that intentionally 
frightening, or attempting to frighten, a person is a crime. 
There is a split of authority among jurisdictions as to 
whether such conduct is a crime or only a tort. Nearly all 
of the revised criminal codes include such a provision with 
some defining it as a separate offense called ''menacing". 
This subsection is an aggravated form of assault in the 
fourth degree, TD AS 11.41.?30(4), because the frightening 
is accomplished by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous 
47.
instrument. A detailed discussion of both provisions appears 
in§ ·Iv., infra. 
III. TD AS 11.41.220. ASSAULT IfJ THE THIRD DEGREE.
Assault in the third degree is classified as a 
Class C felony because of the seriousness of the victim's 
injury despite the fact that the defendant did not intend 
the result. 
Both forms of assault in the third degree require 
that serious physical injury occur. Subsection (1) provides 
that the defendant commits the crime if he acts with crininal 
negligence (he is unaware of the risk of serious physical 
injury) and causes serious physical injury by means of a 
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. Subsection (2), however, 
provides that if the defendant acts recklessly (he disregards 
a known risk) there is no requirement that the harm be inflicted 
by a particular means. It is expected that the statute will 
primarily be used to prosecute drunk drivers who seriously 
injure their victims. 
IV. TD AS 11.41.230. ASSAULT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE.
Assault in the fourth degree, the basic non-aggravated 
assault statute, is a Class A misdemeanor. The four subsections 
of this statute require that the victim be threatened with 
physical injury or receive such injury. 
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Subsections (1) and (2), by providing that intention­
ally or recklessly causing physical injury constitutes misde­
meanor assault, parallel the existing Assault and Assault and 
Battery statute, AS 11.15.230. 
In subsection (3) the defendant commits assault in 
the fourth degree if he acts with the culpable mental state 
of criminal negligence and causes physical injury by means 
of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 
Subsection (4), and its aggravated form in second 
degree assault, TD AS 11.41.210(4), expand existing law by 
including within the prohibitions of the assault statute 
the "tort" theory of assault -- intentionally placing another 
in fear of receiving an irn.minent battery regardless of 
whether there is present ability to carry out that 
threat. In addition, subsection ( 4) provides. that the assault 
occurs even though the defendant fails to place the victjm 
in apprehension, as long as he intentionalJy attempts to do so. 
The Commentary to the Oregon Revised Code, fro� 
which the provision was derived, provides examples of the 
type of conduct prohibited by this subsection. 
(1) The victim apprehends the danger but does
not fear it; 
(2) The actor's conduct is such as would cause
fear to a reasonable man but the intended victim is 
aware that the actor will not inflict the threatened 
harm, e.g., victim knows the actor's gun is not 
loaded; 
(3) The intended victim is unaware of the
actor's threat, e.g., he is blind and does not know 
the actor is pointing a gun at him. 
OR� § 163.190, Com.mentary at p. 124. 
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During Subcommission discussions, there was some 
sentiment to substitute the word "threaten", which is used 
in current law, in place of the words "places or attempts 
to place another person in fear . . .  " However, it was 
finally agreed that the draft language is preferable because 
it emphasizes that there is no requirement that the victim 
actually be placed in fear - all that is necessary is that 
the defendant attempt to place him in fear. Of course, the 
draft language would cover a conditional threat of imminent 
injury if a demand is not met - i.e., "Bring that book to 
me or I'll kill you." 
V. TD AS 11.41.240. SIMPLE ASSAULT.
This section is derived directly from the Missouri 
Revised Criminal Code. The Commentary to that code considered 
the issue of whether such behavior should be made criminal: 
While it is open to question whether the criminal 
law should deal with [simple offensive touching], 
such a section has advantages. It allows for 
official intervention in a situation which could 
expand into one of physical danger, and gives the 
offended person the opportunity to call for 
official protection. Some offensive touchings 
are covered in the sex offenses chapter, but not 
all touchings of a sexual nature are covered by 
that section. Proposed Mo. Criminal Co�P 
§ 10.070 (West 1973), Commentary at 135.
The simple assault provision, TD AS 11.41.240, was 
primarily drafted to cover sexual touchings which do not qualify 
as sexual contact under the sexual assault article. However, 
by the inclusion of the word "injurious" the statute is broad 
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enough to cover "mere physical contact which does not produce 
[physical] injury" such as "trivial slaps, shoves, kicks, etc." 
[See, ORS 163.185, Commentary at p. 121.] 
It should be noted that the New York and Oregon Codes 
classified this type of conduct as "Harassment" rather than as 
an assault. However, the Subcommission concluded that the 
Revised Code should cover all forms of assault, other than 
those described in the sexual offenses article, in a single 
article. 
VI. TD AS 11. 41. 250. RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT. 
TD AS 11.41.250, though new to existing Alaska law, 
has its equivalent in nearly all of the revised codes. If a 
person engages in reckless conduct and death results, he will 
be guilty of either murder or manslaughter depending on the 
presence of "extreme indifference to the value of human life." 
If the person engages in the same conduct but no one is killed, 
but someone is injured, he will be guilty of some degree of 
assault. This subsection covers the situation where he acts 
with the same degree of recklessness as regards human life but, 
fortunately, no one is injured. In most crimes defined in 
terms of causing a result such as death or physical injury, if 
the actor fails to achieve the result he will be guilty of a 
lesser degree of crime by virtue of the attempted crimes. How­
ever, crimes defined in terms of recklessly causing a result 
cannot be ' attempted" and so a separate section is needed to 
fill this gap. 
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SECTION 
300 Kidnapping in the first degree 
310 Kidnapping in the second degree 
320 Custodial interference in the first degree 
330 Custodial interference in the second degree 
340 Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree 
350 Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree 
360 Coercion 
370 Definitions 
Sec. 11.41.300. KIDNAPPING IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A person
commits the crime of kidnapping in the first degree if he abducts 
another person with intent to 
(1) hold him for ransom;
(2) use him as a shield or hostage;
(3) inflict physical injury upon him, or sexually assault
him; 
(4) place the victim or a third person in apprehension that
the victim will receive serious physical injury or will be sexually 
assaulted; 
(5) interfere with the performance of any governmental or
political function; or 
(6) facilitate the commission of any felony or flight after
commission of a felony, during the course of the kidnapping. 
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under (a) of
this section that the defendant voluntarily causes the release of the 
victim in a safe place before trial, alive and without having caused 
serious physical injury to the victim and without having sexually assaul­
ted him. Nothing in this subsection constitutes a defense to a prosecu-
ARTICLE 3. KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES. 
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tion or precludes a conviction of kidnapping in the second degree or 
any other crime. 
(c) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.
Sec. 11.41.310. KIDNAPPING IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A person 
commits the crime of kidnapping in the second degree if he abducts 
another person. 
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under (a) of
this section that 
(1) the defendant is a relative of the person abducted;
(2) the sole intent of the defendant is to assume control of
that person; and 
(3) the abduction is not coupled with intent to use or to
threaten to use deadly physical force or to sexually assault or to 
threaten to sexually assault the victim. 
(c) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony.
Sec. 11.41.320. CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) 
A person commits the crime of custodial interference in the first 
degree if he violates sec. 330 of this chapter and 
(1) causes the person taken, enticed, or kept from his lawful
custodian to be removed from the state; or 
(2) exposes the person to a substantial risk of illness or
physical injury. 
(b) Custodial interference in the first degree is a class C
felony. 
Sec. 11. 41. 330. CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) 
A person commits the crime of custodial interference in the second 
degree if, knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes, en­
tices, or keeps a person from his lawful custodian with intent to hold 
him permanently or for a protracted period. 
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(b) Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A
misdemeanor. 
Sec. 11.41.340. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) 
A person commits the crime of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree 
if he restrains another person under circumstances which expose the 
person to risk of serious physical injury. 
(b) Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree is a class A mis­
demeanor. 
Sec. 11.41.350. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) 
A person commits the crime of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree 
if he restrains another person. 
(b) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under (a) of
this section that 
(1) the person restrained is less than 12 years old;
(2) the defendant is a relative of the person restrained;
(3) his sole intent is to assume control of the child; and
(4) the restraint is not coupled with intent to use or to
threaten to use deadly physical force or to sexually assault or to 
threaten to sexually assault the victim. 
(c) Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree is a class B mis­
demeanor. 
Sec. 11.41.360. COERCION. (a) A person commits the crime of
coercion if he compels or induces another person to engage in conduct 
from which the other person has a legal right to abstain, or to abstain 
from engaging in conduct in which the other person has a legal right to 
engage, by instilling in him a fear that, if the demand is not complied 
with, the actor or another will
(1) cause physical injury to any person;
(2) cause damage to property;
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(3) subject any person to physical confinement or restraint;
(4) engage in conduct constituting a crime;
(5) accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to
be instituted against any person; 
(6) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether
true or false, tending to subject any person to hatr�d, contempt, or 
ridicule or to impair his credit or business repute; 
(7) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or
information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; 
(8) use or abuse his position as a public servant by perform­
ing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or 
refusing to perform an official duty, in a manner which will affect some 
person adversely; 
(9) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other
collective action, if the property is not demanded or received for the 
benefit of the group in whose interest the person purports to act; or 
(10) inflict any other harm which would not benefit the person
making the threat. 
(b) A threat to perform any of the acts described in (a) of this
section includes an offer to protect another from any harmful act when 
the offeror has no apparent means to provide the protection or when the 
price asked for rendering the protection service is grossly dispropor­
tionate to its cost to the offeror. 
(c) In a prosecution under (a)(S) of this section, it is an affir­
mative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened 
charge to be true and that his sole intent was to compel or induce the 
victim to take reasonable action to correct the wrong which is the 
subject of the threatened charge. 
(d) Coercion is a class A misdemeanor.
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Sec. 11.41.370. DEFINITIONS. In secs. 300 - 360 of this chapter, 
unless the context otherwise requires 
(1) "abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to pre­
vent his liberation by either 
(A) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not
likely to be found; or 
(B) using or threatening to use deadly physical force;
(2) "lawful custodian" means a parent, guardian, or other
person responsible by authority of law for the care, custody or control 
of another; 
(3) "relative" means a parent or stepparent, ancestor,
descendant, sibling, uncle or aunt, including a relative of the same 
degree through marriage or adoption; 
(4) "restrain" means to restrict a person's movements unlaw­
fully and without consent, so as to interfere substantially with his 
liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him 
either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to 
which he has been moved; a restraint is "without consent" if it is 
accomplished by 
(A) physical force, intimidation or deception; or
(B) any means, including acquiescence of the victim, if
he is less than 12 years old or an incompetent person, and 
his lawful custodian has not acquiesced in the movement or 
confinement. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 41 - Offenses Against the Person 
ARTICLE 3. KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of Kidnapping and Related Offenses. 
In defining the crimes of kidnapping, custodial 
interference, unlawful imprisonment and coercion, the 
Kidnapping and Related Offenses Article: 
1. Broadens the existing "Child Stealing" provision
into a general statute covering all forms of
custodial interference.
2. Crea Jces tl1e crime o:E t1nlawft1l iBprisonr:.1ent
which criminalizes the restraint of a person
without the aggravating factors necessary for
kidnapping.
3. Clearly defines the terms "abduct" and "restrain"
as the distinction between kidnapping and unlaw­
ful imprisonment.
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11.41.370. DEFINITIONS 
The terms "abduct" and "restrain", defined in 
subsections (1) and (4), form the foundation of the 
kidnapping article of the Revised Code. 
The term "abduct" is used, but not defined, in 
the existing kidnapping statute. The Revised Code defines 
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"abduction" as the most serious form of restraint, involving 
significant movement of the victim, isolation or violence 
which are popularly associated with the concept of kidnap­
ping. 
In the Revised Code "restraint" is the form of 
action involved in the crime of unlawful imprisonment while 
"abduction" is necessary to a kidnapping. "Restrain" is 
defined as an unlawful, non-consensual removal or confine­
ment of a person of a sort "to interfere substantially with 
his liberty". The term includes conduct from the most 
serious cases down to removals and confinements not involving 
a high degree of isolation, dissappearance or violence. 
The term "lawful custodian'', subsection (2), is 
used in defining "restrain" as well as in the custodial 
interference statutes. The term includes parents, guardians 
and institutions whose permission must be obtained for the 
lawful removal of persons under their care. 
"Relative" is defincn in �ubsection (3) to include 
both parents and close relatives. The term is used in 
TD AS 11.41.310 and 320 in connection with defenses to kid­
napping in the second degree and custodial interference in 
the second degree. 
II. TD AS 11.41.300, 310. KIDNAPPING IN THE FIRST AND 
SECOND DEGREE 
A. Existing Law
Kidnapping is an aggravated form of false impri­
sonment which originally involved transportiltion out of the 
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realm, and thus beyond the power of the sovereign's authority 
to protect the victim by law. Alaska, like most states, 
has a specific kidnapping statute, AS 11.15.260. Explicitly 
exempted from the coverage of the existing statute is the 
abduction of a minor by his parent. Punishment is for any 
term of imprisonment up to life. The statute has never 
been interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
B. The Code Provision
The Revised Code retains the primary thrust of
the existing kidnapping statute. The basic act for 
kidnapping is "abduction", defined in TD AS 11.41.370(2) to 
mean "restraint" which is aggravated by intent to prevent 
the victim's liberation either by secreting or holding 
him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or by 
using or threatening to use deadly physical force. It is 
thus the factor of either secret restraint or the actual 
or threatened use of life-endangering physical force that 
sets kidnapping apart from unlawful imprisonment. In effect, 
then, kidnapping is an aggravated form of unlawful imprison­
ment as it was at common law. 
Kidnapping in the second degree embraces the 
entire spectrum of kidnapping conduct, other than child 
custody cases. The most heinous forms of kidnapping 
have been singled out in first degree kidnapping for purposes 
of imposing a higher penalty. 
First degree kidnapping, TD AS 11.41.310, 
aggravates the penalties for kidnapping if the actor has 
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a further intent than that embodied in the definition of 
abduction itself. The first class of aggravating intents 
is set out in subsection (a) (1), the intent to hold the 
victim for ransom. The second, (a) (2), is the intent to 
use the victim as a shield or hostage, again a potentially 
highly dangerous motivation. The third, (a) (3), is the 
intent to inflict physical injury on the victim or to 
sexually assault him. A fourth motivation, (a) (4), is an 
intent to place the victim or a third person in apprehension 
that the victim will receive serious physical injury or 
will be sexually assaulted. The fifth motivation, (a) (5), 
is to interfere with the performance of any governmental 
or political function. This would include, for example, 
kidnapping a legislator so that he would be unable to 
participate in official debates. 
Subsection (a) ( 6) punishes an abduction with intent 
to facilitate a felony. The Proposed Missouri Criminal Code 
provides a discussion of the policy behind subsection (a) (6) 
[First degree] Kidnapping is not meant to cover 
the confinement or movement which is merely incidental 
to the commission of another offense. For example, 
many robberies will involve temporary confinement or 
movement for a short distance (as when the victim is 
made to move to another part of the room). To take 
such incidental confinement or movement and punish 
it as kidnapping would be making two crimes out of 
what is basically one offense. In these situations 
the movement or confinement does not add any addi­
tional danger to what is already present from the 
crime of robbery, and there is no purpose served by 
punishing this movement or confinement as the very 
serious offense of kidnapping .... Commentary, §10.110, 
p 137-138. 
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TD AS ll.41.300(b) recognizes an affirmative 
defense (which the defendant must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence) to kidnapping in the first degree. The 
defense is available if the defendant voluntarily releases 
the victim in a safe place before trial without having 
caused serious physical injury to him and without having 
sexually assaulted him. In theory this affirmative defense 
will encourage the defendant to exercise care in the 
custody of a victim and to release the victim when 
doubts arise in the kidnapper's mind. The defense 
only applies to kidnapping in the first degree; if voluntary 
release occurs, the defendant could still be convicted of 
kidnapping in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment or 
assault. 
TD AS ll.41.310(b) provides that a relative has 
an affirmative defense to kidnapping in the second degree 
if he abducts the victim with the sole intent to assume 
control over him and the abduction is not coupled with 
intent to use or threaten to use deadly physical force or 
intent to sexually assault the victim. 
The justification for the preferential treatment 
accorded relatives in this subsection is the view that 
relatives who abduct victims are acting in response to 
understandable if misguided domestic passion and have a 
genuine interest or affection for the victim. Thus, their 
co.nduct is neither as culpable as that of the kidnapper who 
is not related nor are they as likely to endanger the 
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victim's welfare or sense of security as would the stranger 
who abducts. However, while the relative has not committed 
kidnapping he may have committed custodial interference. 
III. TD AS 11.41.320, 330. CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE IN THE 
FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE - RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING 
LAW - THE CODE PROVISION 
AS 11.15.290, the child stealing statute, has 
never been interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court. A 
review of that statute read in conjunction with the 
existing provision raises the serious question of whether 
existing law provides penalties for the non-consensual 
abduction by a parent of a child over 12 but under 18 
since the kidnapping statute does not cover the abduction 
of a minor by his parent, while the child stealing statute 
appears to only protect children under 12. 
Under the Revised Code, the crime of custodial 
interference includes the conduct proscribed by existing 
AS 11.15.290. However, the offense goes beyond the 
present statute by protecting not only the interference 
with custody of children under the age of 12, but with 
the custody of any person who has a custodian. The draft 
also would repeal AS 11.20.420, "Substituting a Child for 
Infant Committed to One's Care". This offense would now 
be covered under TD AS 11.41.310. 
The crime of custodial interference is intended 
to cover the typical "child-stealing" situation committed 
by a relative. The language of the Revised statute is 
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broad enough to encompass any interference with lawful 
custody rights by a person having no legal right to do 
so if he has the intent to hold the person taken for a 
protracted period. Thus, the section covers not only 
child-custody situations, but also children in state 
custody, incompetents or others who are entrusted 
by law to the custody of another person or 
institution. 
Custodial interference in the first degree, 
TD AS 11.41.330, is an aggravated form of the basic offense, 
the aggravating factors being: 
1. the victim is taken out of the state; or
2. the victim is exposed to a substantial risk
of illness or physical injury.
IV. TD AS 11.41.340, 350 - UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT IN THE
FIRST OR SECOND DEGREE - THE CODE PROVISION 
Though Alaska Law currently does not provide for 
the crime of false imprisonment not amounting to kidnapping 
or child-stealing, TD AS 11.41.340, 350 create this offense. 
In view of the broad definition of the word 
"restrain", TD AS 11.41.370, unlawful imprisonment embraces 
every type of unlawful restraint ranging from the most 
sinister kidnapping conduct down to relatively trivial 
confinements. The principal utility or application of 
the section is to the cases not falling within the scope 
of the kidnapping statutes because the aggravating intent 
factors cannot be proved. 
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The basic element of the offense is defined 
entirely by reference to the word "restraint". "Restrain" 
is defined in TD AS 11.41.370(1) to mean a substantial and 
unlawful interference with a person's liberty by moving 
him from one place to another or by confining him. A 
person is restrained when his freedom to go where he pleases 
is restricted by physical force, intimidation or deception, 
or, if he is under 12 years of age or an incompetent, by 
any means including his own acquiescence in the absence 
of consent by his legal custodian. 
As TD AS 11.41.350 indicates, a defendant 
has an affirmative defense to unlawful imprisonment if he is 
a relative and the sole motivation for the restraint is to 
assume control of the "victim" without abusing him. Under 
the definition of restraint, agreement to the taking by a 
child under 12 years of age is legally irrelevant. If a 
child who is at least 12 consents without being deceived, he 
is not "restrained". 
TD AS 11.41.340 raises the crime of unlawful 
imprisonment from an A misdemeanor to a C felony when the 
restriction involves an element of danger to the victim. 
Such would be the case if, for example, a person were 
locked in a closet for a brief time but under circumstances 
entailing a substantial risk of suffocation. 
The combined effects of TD AS 11.41.310, 330 and 
and 350 render the provisions on unlawful imprisonment and 
kidnapping inapplicable to consensual and nonforceful 
64.
acquisition of control over another because of familial 
considerations and create a special offense for unauthorized 
interference with lawful custody. While aimed primarily 
at eliminating kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment offenses 
from child custody disputes, these provisions do protect 
"parental custody against all unlawful interruption, even 
when the child itself is a willing, undeceived participant 
in the attack on this interest of its parent". Model 
Penal Code § 212.4, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960). 
In addition, the provisions fill a similar need to 
protect the lawful custody of persons who are entrusted 
to institutional care under authority of law. 
V. TD AS 11.41.370. COERCION
A. Existing Law
Existing law now contains two statutes which
cover the conduct denominated as Coercion in the Revised 
Code - AS 11.20.345, Extortion, and AS 11.15.300, Blackmail. 
The existing extortion statute requires that 
property be obtained by one of the enumerated threats. The 
existing blackmail statute does not require that anything be 
obtained from the victim but only recognizes three forms of 
threats by which the crime may be committed. The 
blackmail statute also encompasses the crime of attempted 
extortion ("threatens ... with intent to extort property"). 
Finally, while the blackmail statute covers some of the acts 
described in the Coercion statute, it only covers conduct 
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done with an intent to compel an actor to do an act, not 
conduct done with an intent to compel the actor to refrain 
from doing an act. 
B. The Revised Code Provision
Coercion consists of compelling a person by
intimidation to commit or refrain from committing an act. 
Coercion is separated from the offense of theft 
by extortion. Extortion is basically a form of coercion 
in which the act compelled is the payment of money. With 
the crime of coercion any act may be compelled. Nevertheless, 
the statute defines coercion in terms similar to theft 
by extortion; the kinds of threats which form a basis for 
the offense of coercion are the same as those contained 
in the extortion section. 
Coercion requires intimidation; the victim must 
actually act or refrain from acting because of fear instilled 
by the defendant. A mere threat or attempt, failing of 
its coercive purpose, would constitute attempted coercion. 
The coercion statute is based on the premise 
that the forceful compulsion by means of a threat ought 
to be recognized as a crime even though the offense 
committed cannot be measured by a monetary standard. 
The problem arises in coercion as to how to measure the 
gravity of the actor's misconduct since the act sought 
to be compelled may be of slight significance such as 
threatening to call the police unless the victim ceases 
seeing the defendant's daughter or the act may be 
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as serious as attempting to compel the victim to leave town. 
The Model Penal Code, § 212.5(2), attempts to measure the 
gravity of the defendant's misconduct on the basis of whether 
the threat is to commit a felony or the actor's purpose is 
felonious. New York Revised Penal Law § 135.65 raises the 
offense a degree on the basis of (1) the kind of threat 
specified and (2) the kind of conduct which he compels the 
victim to perform. 
The Revised Code adopts neither of these measures 
but defines only one degree of coercion. This affords some 
protection against such threats but avoids imposing addi­
tional penalties on the basis of distinctions of questionable 
validity. This is in accord with the committee commentary 
to the Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code, which states: 
"The committee is not persuaded that the 
utility in subjecting some persons who commit 
coercion to extended prison terms outweighs the 
difficulties inherent in classifying the parti­
cular threats made." (§2125) 
Subsection (b) parallels the similar provision 
in the extortion statute and is derived directly from 
existing law. 
Subsection (c) is the counterpart to the defense 
to extortion where there is an honest claim to the 
property obtained as restitution or indemnification for 
harm done. It would be incongruous to hold the actor 
not guilty of extortion if property passes, but to hold 
him guilty of coercion if some other act is involved. The 
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subsection also preserves freedom to negotiate out-of-court 
settlements. As an example, a defendant accused of 
coercion for having compelled a youth, by threat of 
charging him with criminal mischief, to repaint the 
defendant's fence which the youth had vandalized would 
have this defense available to him. 
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SECTION 
400 
410 
420 
430 
440 
450 
460 
ARTICLE 4. SEXUAL OFFENSES. 
General provisions 
Sexual assault in the first degree 
Sexual assault in the second degree 
Sexual assault in the third degree 
Sexual assualt in the fourth degree 
Indecent exposure 
Definitions 
Sec. 11. 41. 400. GENERAL PROVISIONS. (a) In secs. 400 - 460 of
this chapter 
(1) whenever the criminality of conduct depends upon a victim
being less than a certain age, it is an affirmative defense that, at the 
time of the alleged offense, the defendant reasonably believed the 
victim to be above that age. This belief shall not be considered 
reasonable if the victim was less than 13 years of age at the time of 
the alleged offense; 
(2) whenever the criminality of conduct depends upon a victim
being incapacitated, it is a defense that, at the time of the alleged 
offense, the defendant reasonably believed that the victim was not 
incapacitated and reasonably believed that the victim consented to the 
act. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of a 
defense under this paragraph. 
(b) A person does not commit the crime of sexual assault if the
victim is his or her legal spouse unless the spouses are living apart 
and one of them has filed for divorce. This subsection may not be con­
strued to preclude accomplice liability of a spouse. 
Sec. 11.41.410. SEXUAL ASSUALT IN THE FIRST DEGREE. (a) A person
commits the crime of sexual assault in the first degree if 
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(1) being any age, he knowingly engages in sexual penetration
with a person without consent of that person; 
(2) being any age, he engages in sexual penetration with
another person under 13 years of age; or 
(3) being 18 years of age or older, he knowingly engages in
sexual penetration with a person under 18 years of age who is related to 
him, either legitimately or illegitimately, as
(A) his ancestor or descendant of the whole or half
blood, or by adoption; 
(B) his brother or sister of the whole or half blood;
(C) his uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the whole or
half blood, or by adoption; or 
(D) his stepchild, while the marriage creating the
relationship exists. 
(b) Sexual assault in the first degree is a class A felony.
Sec. 11.41.420. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of sexual assault in the second degree if 
(1) being any age, he knowingly engages in sexual contact
with a person without consent of that person; 
(2) being any age, he engages in sexual contact with another
person under 13 years of age; or 
(3) being 18 years of age or older, he knowingly engages in
sexual contact with a person under 18 years of age who is related to 
him, either legitimately or illegitimately, as 
(A) his ancestor or descendant of the whole or half
blood, or by adoption; 
(B) his brother or sister of the whole or half blood;
(C) his uncle, aunt, nephew or niece of the whole or
half blood, or by adoption; or 
70.
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
LA-L 20
(D) his stepchild, while the marriage creating the
relationship exists. 
(b) Sexual assault in the second degree is a class B felony.
Sec. 11.41.430. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE THIRD DEGREE. 
commits the crime of sexual assault in the third degree if 
(a) A person
(1) being 18 years of age or older, he engages in sexual
penetration with a person under 16 years of age; or 
(2) being any age, he engages in sexual penetration with
another person who is incapable of consent by reason of incapacitation. 
(b) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class C felony.
Sec. 11.41.440. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE. (a) A 
person commits the crime of sexual assault in the fourth degree if 
(1) being 19 years of age or older, he engages in sexual
contact with a person under 16 years of age, or 
(2) being any age, he engages in sexual contact with another
person who is incapable of consent by reason of incapacitation. 
(b) Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 11.41.450. INDECENT EXPOSURE. (a) A person commits the 
crime of indecent exposure if he intentionally exposes, directly or 
through clothing, his genitals, buttock, or anus, or directly exposes 
her female breast to another with reckless disregard for the offensive, 
provocative, or insulting effect the act may have on that person. 
(b) Indecent exposure is a class A misdemeanor.
Sec. 11.41.460. DEFINITIONS. In secs. 400 - 450 of this chapter 
(1) "actor" means the person accused of sexual assault;
(2) "incapacitated" means a physical or mental condition,
temporary or permanent, in which a person is incapable of appraising the 
nature of his conduct or of expressing unwillingness to act; 
(3) "sexual contact" means
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(A) the intentional touching by the actor of the vic­
tim's genitals, anus or female breast or the intentional touching 
by the actor of the victim's genitals or anus through clothing; or 
(B) the actor's intentionally causing the victim to
touch the actor's or victim's genitals, anus or female breast, or 
causing the victim to touch the actor's or victim's genitals or 
anus through clothing; 
(4) "sexual penetration" means genital intercourse, cunnilin­
gus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, 
of an object or any part of a person's body into the genital or anal 
opening of another person's body, but emission of semen is not required; 
(5) "victim" means the person alleged to have been subjected
to sexual assault; 
(6) "without consent" means that a person
(A) with or without resisting, is coerced by the use of
physical force against a person or property, or by the express or 
implied threat of imminent death, imminent physical injury, or 
imminent kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone; or 
(B) is incapacitated as a result of an act committed by
the actor. 
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ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 41 - Offenses Against the Person 
ARTICLE 4. SEXUAL OFFENSES 
COMMENTARY 
The Effect of the Revised Code Provisions on the Existing 
Law of Sexual Offenses 
In defining the crimes of sexual assault and 
indecent exposure, the Sexual Offenses Article: 
1. Establishes four degrees of sexual assault
which are distinguished on two general grounds:
(1) whether sexual penetration, as opposed to
sexual contact, occurred, and (2) whether 
certain forceful elements were present in the 
commission of the crime. Penetration is required 
for first and third degree sexual assault, whereas 
the second and fourth degree provisions apply only 
to sexual contact. Sexual penetration or sexual 
contact that occurs without the consent of the 
victim qualifies as first or second degree sexual 
assault. Existing law categorizes a sexual assault 
short of penetration as a misdemeanor assault 
rather than as a sexual offense, and at best is 
unclear on whether rape occurs if the victim does 
not forcibly resist. 
2. Substitutes the defined terms "sexual penetration",
"sexual contact" and "without consent" for the
archaic term "carnal knowledge" and the archaic
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and undefined terms "lewd and lascivious acts" 
and "forcibly and against the will". 
3. Specifically recognizes that penetration of an
object into the genital or anal opening constitutes
sexual penetration.
4. Eliminates, by the definition of "without consent",
any contention that under the existing rape statute
a victim must forcibly resist a sexual assault to
the utmost and that resistance must continue until
the act has been terminated.
5. Recognizes that a physically or mentally incapacitated
person who is incapable of appraising the nature
of his conduct or of expressing unwillingness to
act requires protection from sexual activity even
though the act did not occur "without consent".
6. Expands the coverage of the existing incest
statute by recognizing the potential for abuse
of adoptive relatives and step-children.
7. Specifically lists the types of acts which violate
the indecent exposure statute.
8. In revising the sexual offenses article to cover
behavior which poses a real threat to the victim
or to society, the Subcommission broadened the cover­
age of several statutes to cover antisocial conduct
which is not now criminal. At the same time, the
subcommission found an absence of compelling state
interest in some (but not all) applications of a
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number of statutes which criminalize private sexual activity 
between consenting adults - Adultery, AS 11.40.010, Cohabi­
tation, AS 11.40.040 and Sodomy, AS 11.40.120. Insofar 
as these statutes involve sexual activity between minors, 
sexual activity that is non-consensual, or sexual activity 
in public, the sexual offenses article provides greater 
protection than is found in existing law. 
However, because these statutes go further and 
prohibit consensual activity between adults in private, 
the Tentative Draft has eliminated these applications from 
the Revised Code. 
In doing so, the Subcommission recognized that 
any statute prohibiting private consensual sexual activity 
between adults is subject to constitutional attack in light 
of the court's holding in Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 
(Ak. 19 7 5) , that " citizens of the State of Alaska have 
a basic right to privacy in their houses under Alaska's 
Constitution." Indeed, in the earlier case of Harris v. State, 
457 P.2d 638, 645 (Ak. 1969), though the issue was not before 
the court, the Alaska Supreme Court noted that " ... at least 
some of us might perceive a right to privacy claim" if the 
sodomy statute was used to prosecute cases involving 
consensual activity between adults. 
The Subcommission recognized that large numbers 
of people share with them strong sentiment regarding the 
immorality of some of the conduct which would not be 
criminal under the Tentative Draft. 
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But as justice professionals and citizens, the 
Subcomrnission also recognized that there are limits beyond 
which utilization of criminal sanctions loses its meaning 
and may become destructive to social interest as a result 
of capricious special applications, constitutional infringe­
ments or non-enforcement leading to general contempt for 
law or misallocation of limited law-enforcement resources. 
The careful line which the Subcommission has 
drawn is well illustrated by the absence of any history in 
this state of criminal prosecutions in all the classes of 
behavior excluded from the reach of the criminal law under 
the Tentative Draft. 
SECTION ANALYSIS OF REVISED CODE 
I. TD AS 11.41.460 - DEFINITIONS
Key to the Sexual Offenses article of the Revised 
Code are definitions of four key terms, "sexual penetration", 
"without consent", "incapacitated" and "sexual contact". 
A. Subsections (1) and (5). Actor and Victim 
The terms "actor" and "victim" are defined to 
aid in drafting the definitions and general provisions 
which follow. 
It should be noted that the term "person" is not 
defined in the sexual assault article. Instead, it is 
defined with the other general definitions which apply 
throughout the Revised Code. That definition includes all 
natural persons. Consequently, the offenses defined in 
this article are "sexless" ones and may be committed by a 
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male or female actor upon a male or female victim. The use 
of the pronoun "his" throughout the article is merely used 
for drafting convenience and is not intended in any way to 
detract from the Revised Code's "sex-neutral" approach to 
sexual offenses. 
B. Subsection (2). Incapacitated 
When first considered by the Subcommission, the 
concept of incapacitation was presented in three sections 
defining "mentally incapacitated", "mentally defective" 
and "physically helpless" victims. It was decided that 
these concepts should be contained in the single definition 
of "incapacitated". 
Though not explicitly found in existing law, the 
concept of "incapacitation'' is designed to offer special 
protection to those who are deemed by the law to be incapable 
of giving effective consent. This concept is based on the 
provisions in existing law that recognize that the consent 
of a person under 16 is irrelevant in determining whether 
a sexual assault has occurred. 
C. Subsection (3). Sexual Contact 
Existing AS 11.15.134 prohibits "lewd or lascivious 
acts" with a child. The definition of "sexual contact" in 
subsection (3) replaces the existing term and sets forth 
the specific acts which are currently left undefined. 
The definition of "sexual contact" has been broken 
into two parts to insure that it includes both situations 
where the actor touches the victim in specified areas as 
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well as situations where the actor causes the victim to 
touch the actor or the victim. Further, the definition 
specifically includes the touching of the genitals or 
anus through clothing as "sexual contact". 
The definition is drafted in a manner to insure 
that less serious forms of sexual conduct are not subjected 
to the penalty structure of this article. For example, an 
actor who slaps the buttock of another has not committed a 
sexual assault since the definition of "sexual contact" 
does not include a touching of the buttock. While this 
conduct does not qualify as sexual assault, it nevertheless 
qualifies as a simple assault pursuant to TD AS 11.41.240 
as it does under existing law. 
D. Subsection (4). Sexual Penetration
Existing AS ll.15.120(b) requires that the defendant
"carnally know" the victim to have committed rape. "Carnal 
knowledge'' is defined to include "sexual, oral and anal 
intercourse, with some penetration, however slight". In 
the Revised Code the term "sexual penetration'' is substituted 
for the archaic term "carnal knowledge". 
The definition of "sexual penetration" is con­
sistent with existing law by including oral-genital sex 
and anal penetration within the defintion of "sexual pene­
tration" but broadens existing coverage by including the 
intrusion " ... of an object or any part of a person's body 
into the genital or anal opening of another person's body". 
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E. Subsection (6). Without consent 
The definition of "without consent", is used in 
the Revised Code in place of the presently used term "forcibly 
and against the will". This definition is of critical 
importance in defining the offenses of sexual assault in 
the first and second degrees. 
Though the phrase "forcibly and against the will" 
has not been interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court, decisions 
in other states interpreting similar language in statutes 
which have recently been repealed have required that the 
victim resist the sexual assault " ... from the inception 
to the close." People v. Murphy, 108 N.W. 1009 (Mich. 1906). 
The Oregon Supreme Court once held that resistance must be 
" ... continued to the extent of the woman's ability until 
the act has been consummated 
764, 765 (Ore. 1951) . 
" State v. Risen, 235 P 2d 
By requiring the victim to resist to the utmost 
until the act is completed or until the victim's mind is 
overcome by abject fear of her life, statutes similar to 
Alaska's existing provision have required of a rape victim 
a level of resistance required in no other crime of violence. 
Interpretations of now discredited statutes similar to 
the existing Alaska provision have denied the victim of a 
sexual assault the opportunity to rationally assess the danger 
and choose the safest course of action. Under the existing 
law, the victim may be required to ignore the advice 
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generally given by the police about victim behavior in 
the course of armed robberies and other crimes of 
violence. 
While it is probable that today the Alaska Supreme 
Court would not interpret the phrase "forcibly and against 
the will" as restrictively as the courts in Risen and 
Murphy, supra, the definition of "without consent" eliminates 
any inference that the victim must forcibly resist the sexual 
assault. Instead, in a prosecution for sexual assault that 
occurs "without consent" of the victim, the state is 
required to prove that the victim was coerced by the actual 
use of force against any person or property or by the 
"express or implied threat of imminent death, imminent 
physical injury, or imminent kidnapping to be inflicted on 
anyone". 
Finally, the definition also provides that sexual 
penetration or contact is "without consent" if it is committed 
upon a victim who was incapacitated by an act committed by 
the defendant, i.e., slipping a narcotic in a drink. 
II. TD AS 11.41.400 - GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Subsection (a) (1) Mistake as to Age
Subsection (a) (1) allows reasonable mistake as to
the age of the victim as an affirmative defense under limited 
circumstances where criminal liability depends on that 
factor. While existing law recognizes that "persons having 
illegal relations with children do so at their own peril", 
Anderson v. State 384 P 2d 669, 671 (Ak. 1963), the Revised 
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Code allows a defendant to escape liability if he proves by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed 
the victim to be above 16 when criminality depends on the 
victim being less than 16. However, subsection (a) (1) 
specifically provides that no defense exists if the victim 
was less than 13 at the time of the sexual assault. 
The following excerpts from People v. Hernandez, 
393 P.2d 673, 674 (Cal. 1964), one of the leading cases 
in this area, provides a valuable framework for consideration 
of this affirmative defense. The court, in ruling that 
a reasonable mistake of age could be a defense to statutory 
rape, stated: 
[We] are dealing here, of course, with statutory 
rape where, in one sense, the lack of consent of 
the female is not an element of the offense. In 
a broader sense, however, the lack of consent is 
deemed to remain an element but the law makes a 
conclusive presumption of the lack thereof because 
she is presumed too innocent and naive to under­
stand the i�plications and nature of her act. 
(Citations ommitted). The law's concern with her 
capacity or lack thereof to so understand is 
explained in part by a popular conception of the 
social, moral and personal values which are preserved 
by the abstinence from sexual indulgence on the 
part of a young woman. An unwise disposition of 
her sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to 
herself and the social mores by which the 
community's conduct patterns are established. 
Hence the law of statutory rape intervenes in an 
effort to avoid such a disposition. This goal, 
moreover, is not accomplished by penalizing the 
naive female but by imposing criminal sanctions 
against the male, who is conclusively presumed 
to be responsible for the occurrence. (Citations 
ommjtted). 
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The assumption that age alone will 
bring an understanding of the sexual act to a 
young woman is of doubtful validity. Both learning 
from the cultural group to which she is a member 
and her actual sexual experiences will determine 
her level of comprehension ... Nevertheless, even 
in circumstances where a girl's actual comprehension 
contradicts the law's presumption, the male is 
deemed criminally responsible for the act, although 
himself young and naive and responding to advances 
which may have been made to him. 
In providing that the defense of mistake as to 
age is inapplicable when the victim is less than 13, the 
following factors were considered by the Subcommission. 
(1) A child of such age would be considerably
below the age of sexual pursuit by normal p�rsons; 
(2) Sexual conduct with a child below this age
can be extremely dangerous, both physically and 
mentally to the child; 
(3) In such cases there is little probability
that the actor is proceeding on normal, if 
misguided, sexual motivation. 
B. Subsection (a) (2). Mistake as to Incapacitation
Consistent with its treatment of reasonable
mistake as to age, the Revised Code begins with a strict 
liability approach as to whether the victim was incapaci­
tated. Thus, if the only evidence at trial establishes 
that the defendant engaged in sexual penetration or contact 
with an incapacitated victim, the state has proved its case. 
Subsection (a) (2) allows the defendant to escape 
liability if he raises a reasonable doubt that he reasonably 
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believed the victim was not incapacitated and consented to 
the act. However, unlike the affirmative defense in 
subsection (a) (1), which the defendant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence, subsection (a) (2) provides 
that the defendant only has the burden of injecting the 
defense. Consequently, once the defendant has come forward 
with some evidence on the issue, the state must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant had no such reasonable 
belief. 
C. Subsection (b). Spousal Immunity 
Subsection (b) excludes from the article's 
coverage sexual activity between spouses and restates the 
existing principle that a spouse may be criminally liable 
as an accomplice for a sexual assault of his spouse, i.e., 
defendant assists a person in sexually assaulting his 
spouse. 
The exclusion of conjugal intercourse, though 
forced, from the prohibition of a rape statute has long 
been recognized under existing law though there is no 
explicit statutory exclusion. 
Subsection (b) would modify this exclusion only 
in those situations where two certain and provable events 
have occurred: 
(1) the couple is living apart, and
(2) one of them has filed for divorce.
This would protect marital privacy when the marriage is 
still viable and ongoing, but also would protect a large 
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and seriously victimized group presently ignored by the 
law. Of course, a person still living with their spouse 
is not immune from a prosecution under the general assault 
provisions of the Revised Code. 
III. TD AS 11.41.410, 430. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE FIRST AND
THIRD DEGREES
A. Existing Law
Rape is currently defined in AS 11.15.120. The
statute defines two separate though related offenses, 
Sekinoff v. U.S., 283 F. 38 (9th Cir. 1922). The first 
offense is similar to the common law definition of rape and 
includes forcible sexual intercourse. 
The second offense is commonly referred to as 
"statutory rape" and includes both consensual and non­
consensual sexual intercourse with a person under 16. Torres 
v. State, 521 P.2d 386 (Ak. 1974). A person under 16 is
deemed in law "incapable of consent". Hutson v. U.S., 
238 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1956). A person presently commits 
statutory rape if he "carnally knows and abuses" a victim 
under 16. 
AS 11.14.130 provides for three different penalty 
schemes for punishment of rape depending on such factors 
as the age of the defendant, the age of the victim and the 
relationship of the victim to the actor. Penalties range. 
from "any term of years" [AS 11.15.130 (a)] to "not more than 
20 years nor less than one year" [AS ll.15.150(c)]. 
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The offense of incest, AS 11.40.110, currently 
provides for a penalty of 3 - 15 years. Incest occurs when 
a person "marries or cohabits or has sexual intercourse" 
with a person related to him "within and not including the 
fourth degree of consanguinity, computed according to the 
rules of thf? civil law". 
B. The Revised Code
Sexual Assault in the First Degree, TD AS 11.41.410,
the most serious form of sexual assault, lists three forms 
of sexual assaults which are considered of equal culpability 
for sentencing purposes. 
Subsection (1) classifies sexual penetration 
accomplished without consent of the victim as first degree 
sexual assault. The definitions of "sexual penetration" 
and "without consent", supra, are of critical importance 
in defining this form of sexual assault. 
Subsection (2) provides that sexual assault 
in the first degree also includes sexual penetration with 
a person under 13 years of age - conduct now classified 
as rape but commonly referred to as "statutory rape". While 
existing law requires that the defendant be over 16, the 
Revised Code provides that the actor may be any age. 
This change makes sense because, unlike existing 
law, the Revised Code recognizes two degrees of "statutory 
rape", depending on whether the victim is less than 13 or 
is between 13 and 16. The apparent purpose of the existing 
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requirement that the actor be over 16 is to avoid labeling 
as felonious a consensual sexual act between two 15-year-olds. 
That purpose is served in the Revised Code by providing in 
third and fourth degree sexual assault that when the victim 
is a 13- to 16-year-old the defendant must be over 18. 
However, with regard to first and second degree sexual assault, 
the Subcornmission concluded that it was inappropriate to adopt 
a statute which would apparently legitimize sexual activity 
with children under 13, and consequently provided that any 
person who engages in such activity commits a crime. In 
eliminating the age requirement for a defendant in the first 
and second degree crime it was recognized that, in practice, 
minors who engage in prohibited sexual activity will be 
treated under juvenile procedure rather than under the 
criminal justice system. 
Subsection (a) (3) includes activity not covered by 
the existing incest statute by specifically including 
within its prohibitions sexual activity between a defined 
class of persons legitimately or illegitimately related 
whether by whole or half-blood. In addition, certain 
adoptive relationships are covered, as well as step-children. 
While existing law refers to the prohibitive class of 
relatives as those "related to another person within and 
not including the fourth degree of consanguinity" the 
Revised Code specifically lists the class in language more 
understandable to the general public as well as to most 
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attorneys. In including consensual sexual penetration 
with relatives as first degree sexual assault, the Revised 
Code is consistent with existing law which also treats 
such activity as an aggravated form of rape. 
It should be noted that the prohibitions of (a) (3) 
apply only if sexual penetration is with a victim under 
18 years of age. Thus, under the Revised Code a consensual 
relationship between adult relatives is not necessarily 
criminal. This change would not affect existing law which 
renders incestuous marriage void, AS 09.55.080. 
TD AS 11.41.430, Sexual Assault in the Third 
Degree, prohibits sexual penetration with two classes of 
persons who are viewed as requiring special protection 
under the law regardless of whether penetration is 
"without consent". 
Subsection (1) prohibits a person 18 or older from 
engaging in sexual penetration with a person under 16 years 
of age. If the victim is under 13, the defendant has com­
mitted first degree sexual assault, supra. This provision 
changes existing law by providing that the actor must be at 
least 18 to have committed sexual assault; existing law 
requires the actor to be at least 16. 
Subsection (2) provides that sexual penetration 
with a person who is incapable of consent by "reason of 
incapacitation" constitutes sexual assault in the third 
degree. If it is established that the assault occurred 
"without consent", first degree sexual assault has occurred. 
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The principal utility of this provision is to penalize 
sexual activity with an incapacitated person who is 
incapable of consenting to a sexual act. 
IV. TD AS 11.41.420 1 440 - SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE SECOND
AND FOURTH DEGREES
A. Existing Law
The existing Lewd or Lascivious Statute,
AS 11.15.134, provides that a person "who commits a lewd 
or lascivious act ... upon the body of a child under 16 
years of age, intending to arouse, appeal to, or gratify 
his lust, passions, or sexual desires, or the lust, passions, 
or sexual desires of the child ... " is guilty of a felony. 
Not only does the statute fail to provide guidance to the 
courts in determining what qualifies as a "lewd or lascivious 
act" but the provision is of limited use since it only applies to 
victims who are under 16. 
Consequently, under existing law, if the victim of 
a sexual assault is 16 or older, and the state is unable to 
prove "carnal knowledge" because penetration cannot be 
established, only the offenses of assault, assault with 
intent to commit rape and attempted rape remain as possible 
charging alternatives. 
While the crimes of assault with intent to commit 
rape and attempted rape carry substantial penalties, they 
are difficult to nrove since the state must establish that 
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the defendant acted with a specific intent to accomplish 
penetration. A conviction for assault pursuant to existing 
AS 11.15.230 carrying only a maximum six month sentence 
is inadequate to penalize acts which, if they occur with 
children, are described as "lewd or lascivious" and are 
punished by a maximum of 10 years imprisonment. 
B. The Code Provision
The crimes of sexual assault in the second and
fourth degree parallel with one major and one minor 
difference the crimes of sexual assault in the first 
and third degree. 
The major difference is that all forms of sexual 
assault in the second and fourth degree involve sexual 
contact as opposed to penetration. Thus, the Revised Code 
closes a gap in existing law by classifying as a form of 
sexual assault specifically defined forms of sexual contact 
that are accomplished without the consent of a victim over lG. 
Sexual assault in the second degree, TD AS 11.41.420, 
prohibits sexual contact without consent, sexual contact 
with persons under 13, and sexual contact with relatives within 
the classification discussed in § III, supra. The statute 
is identical to the first degree crime except the term 
"sexual contact" is substituted for "sexual penetration". 
Subsection (a) (1) of sexual assault in the fourth 
degree prohibits sexual contact with a person under 16 but 
over 13. This subsection parallels TD AS 11.41.430 (a) (1) 
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covering sexual penetration with a person under 16, but raisE�s 
the age of the actor to 19 as opposed to 18, to insure that 
conduct such as "petting" among high school students is not 
criminalized. 
Subsection (a) (2) parallels TD AS 11.41.430 (a) 
(2) and prohibits sexual contact with persons who are
incapable of consent by reason of incapacitation. 
V. TD AS 11.41.450 - INDECENT EXPOSURE
Relationship of Code Provision to Existing Law
By referring to an exposure of "private parts" 
or the taking " ... part in a model artist exhibition ... ", 
the existing indecent exposure statute provides an 
excellent example of the antiquated language that is 
currently found in the Alaska Criminal Statutes. 
To commit the crime of indecent exposure under the 
Revised Code the defendant must intentionally expose, either 
directly or through clothing, his genitals, buttock or 
anus, or directly expose her female breast, to another. 
Hence, a mere inadvertant exposure is not sufficient. Further, 
the actor must act with a culpable mental state of "reckless 
disregard for the offensive, provocative or insulting effect 
such act may have on that person." Thus, the statute does 
not require that the actor know that his exposure will cause 
that effect, but rather that he recklessly disregarded the 
9 0. 
act's possible effect on the victim. Finally, the proposed 
statute does not require that the victim was in fact 
"offended, provoked or insulted" as a consequence of the 
act. Rather, all that is required is that the defendant 
was reckless as to effect of his exposure of the victim. 
Thus, if the actor had good reason to know that his exposure 
would not be offensive to the viewer, no crime has been 
committed. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
Sec. 11. DEFINITIONS. In this title, unless the context 
otherwise requires, 
(1) "benefit" means a present or future gain or advantage to
the beneficiary or to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent 
of the beneficiary, but does not include political campaign contributions 
reported in accordance with the requirements of AS 15.13; 
(2) "building", in addition to its usual meaning, includes
any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft or structure adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons or for carrying on business; when a building 
consists of separate units, including but not limited to apartment units, 
offices, or rented rooms, each unit is considered a separate building; 
(3) "dangerous instrument" means anything which under the
circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened 
to be used, is capable of causing death or serious physical injury; 
(4) "deadly physical force" means physical force that under
the circumstances in which used is capable of causing death or serious 
physical injury; 
(5) "deadly weapon" means any firearm, loaded or unloaded, or
anything designed for and capable of causing death or serious physical 
injury including, but not limited to, a knife, axe, club, metal 
knuckles, explosive, or any weapon from which a shot capable of causing 
death or serious physical injury may be discharged; 
(6) "dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by
a person at night, whether or not a person is actually present; 
(7) "organization" means a legal entity, including a corpora­
tion, company, association, firm, partnership, joint stock company, 
foundation, institution, society, union, club, church, or any other group 
of persons organized for any purpose; 
(8) "peace officer" means a public servant vested by law with
92.
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
WU.Kl\ LJ.KJ\.l'"l' l,;U.l:'l WORK DRA.l<'T COPY WUHK DHA.l<"l' t;U.t'Y 
a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests, whether the duty 
extends to all offenses or is limited to a specific class of offenses 
or offenders; 
(9) "person" means a natural person and, when appropriate, an
organization, government or governmental instrumentality; 
(10) "physical force" means force used upon or directed toward
the body of another person; the term includes confinement; 
(11) "physical injury" means physical pain or an impairment of
physical condition; 
(12) "possess" means having physical possession or the exer­
cise of dominion or control over property; 
(13) "premises" means real property, including a building;
(14) "public servant" means each of the following, whether
compensated or not, but does not include jurors or witnesses: 
(A) an officer or employee of the state, a political
subdivision of the state, or governmental instrumentality of the 
state, including, but not limited to, legislators, members of the 
judiciary and peace officers; 
(B) a person who participates as an advisor, consultant
or assistant at the request or direction of the state, a political 
subdivision, or governmental instrumentality; 
(C) a person who serves as a member of a board or
commission created by statute or by legislative, judicial, or 
administrative action by the state, a political subdivision, or 
governmental instrumentality; 
(D) a person nominated, elected, appointed, employed,
or designated to act in a capacity defined in (A) - (C) of this 
paragraph, but who does not occupy the position; 
(15) "serious physical injury" means physical injury which
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creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious and pro­
tracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or protracted 
loss or impairment of the function of a bodily organ, or physical injury 
which unlawfully terminates a pregnancy. 
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CHAPTER 11. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY. 
Sec. 11.11.099. DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this title, unless 
the context otherwise requires, 
(1) a person acts "intentionally" with respect to a result or
to conduct described by a provision of law defining an offense when his 
conscious objective is to cause that result or to engage in that con­
duct; 
(2) a person acts "knowingly" with respect to conduct or to a
circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when
he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance 
exists; when knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an 
element of an offense, that knowledge is established if a person is 
aware of a substantial probability of its existence, unless he actually 
believes it does not exist; 
(3) a person acts "recklessly" with respect to a result or to
a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when 
he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifi­
able risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; 
the risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard of it con­
stitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reason­
able person would observe in the situation; a person who is unaware of 
a risk of which he would have been aware had he not been intoxicated or 
using drugs acts recklessly with respect to that risk; 
(4) a person acts "with criminal negligence" with respect to
result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining 
an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable 
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risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reason­
able person would observe in the situation. 
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APPENDIX II. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 41 - Offenses Against the Person 
DERIVATIONS 
ARTICLE l - CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
TD AS 11.41.100 - Criminal Homicide 
Subsections (a), (c) (1) and (c) (2) are derived 
directly from ORS 163.005(1)-(3). 
TD AS 11.41.110 - Murder 
Subsection (a) (1) is based on Illinois Criminal 
Code , Ch. 3 8 § 9-1 (a) ( 1) and ( 2) . 
Subsection (a) (2) and (a) (3) are based on 
ORS 161.115 (1) (b) and (c). 
Subsection (b) is based on Illinois Criminal 
Code, Ch. 38 § 9-2 (a) . 
Subsection (c) is based on ORS 163.115(2). 
Subsection (d) codifies common law. 
Subsection (3) is based on ORS 163.115(3). 
TD AS 11.41.120 - Manslaughter 
This section is based on AS 11.15.040. 
TD AS 11.41.130 - Criminally Negligent Homicide 
This section is derived directly from ORS 163.145. 
ARTICLE 2 - ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.41.200, 210 - Assault in the First to 
Fourth Degree 
The degree structure of the assault statutes and 
the various aggravating factors that are used are based on 
the degrees of assault found in the New York and Oregon 
statutes, ORS§§ 163.165 - 190 and N.Y. Penal Law§§ 120.00 -
15, as well as existing Alaska law. 
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TD AS. 11.41.240 - Simple Assault 
This section is based on Proposed Missouri 
Criminal Code § 10.070(e) and Proposed Arizona Revised 
Criminal Code § 12 02 ( a) ( 3) . 
TD AS 11.41.250 - Reckless Endangerment 
This section is derived directly from N.Y. 
Penal Law§ 120.20. 
ARTICLE 3 - KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES 
162.235. 
TD AS 11.41.300 - Kidnapping in the First Degree 
Subsections (a) (1) - (a) (3) are based on ORS 
Subsection (a) (4) is based on Proposed Arizona 
Revised Criminal Code § 1303(a) (4). 
Subsection (a) (5) is based on N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 135.25 (2) (d).
Subsection (a) (6) is based on Proposed Missouri 
Criminal Code § 10.110(1) (d). 
Subsection (b) is based on Proposed Arizona 
Revised Criminal Code § 1303(b). 
TD AS 11.41.310 - Kidnapping in the Second Degree 
Subsection (a) is based on N.Y. Penal Law§ 135.20. 
Subsection (b) is based on N.Y. Penal Law§ 135.30. 
TD AS 11.41.320 - Custodial Interference in the 
First Degree 
This section is based on ORS 163.257. 
TD AS 11.41.330 - Custodial Interference in the 
Second Degree 
This section is based on ORS 16.245. 
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TD AS 11.41.340 - Unlawful Imprisonment in the 
First Degree 
This section is based on N.Y. Penal Law§ 135.10. 
TD AS 11.41.350 - Unlawful Imprisonment in the 
Second Degree 
This section is based on N.Y. Penal Law§ 136.05 
and§ 135.15. 
TD AS 11.41.360 - Coercion 
This section is based on ORS 163.275. 
TD AS 11.41.370 - Definitions 
This section is based on N.Y. Penal Law§ 135.00. 
ARTICLE 4 - SEXUAL OFFENSES 
TD AS 11.41.400 - General Provision 
Subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) are based on 
Proposed Missouri Criminal Code§ 11.020. 
Subsection (b) is based on Michigan Compiled 
Law§ 750.520(1) and AS ll.15.120(b). 
TD AS 11.41.410, 440 - Sexual Assault in the 
First to Fourth Degree 
The degree structure in the sexual assault 
statutes is based primarily on Michigan Compiled Laws 
750.520(b) - (e). 
The listing of prohibitive classes of relatives 
in TD AS ll.41.410(a) (3) and ll.41.420(a) (3) is based on 
Missouri Proposed Criminal Code§ 13.020(1). 
TD AS 11.41.450 - Indecent Exposure 
This section is based on Proposed Arizona 
Revised Criminal Code§ 1403. 
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TD AS 11.41.460 - Definitions 
Subsection (1) is based on Michigan Compiled 
Law § 750. 520 (a) . 
Subsection (2) is based on Proposed Missouri 
Criminal Code § 1.120(12). 
Subsection (3) is based on Michigan Compiled 
Law 750.520(a) and Proposed Arizona Revised Code §1400(b). 
Subsection (4) is based on Michigan Compiled 
Law 750. 520 (a) . 
Subsection (5) is based on Michigan Compiled 
Law 750. 520 (a) . 
Subsection (6) is based on Proposed Arizona 
Revised Criminal Code § 14 00 ( e) ( 1) . 
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APPENDIX III. 
ALASKA REVISED CRIMINAL CODE 
Chapter 41 - Offenses Against the Person 
EXISTING LAW 
ARTICLE 1 - CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
Sec. 11.15. 010. FIRST DEGREE MURDER. A person who, 
being of sound memory and discretion, purposely, and 
either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means 
of poison, or in perpetrating or in attempting to 
perpetrate, rape, arson, robbery, or burglary kills 
another, is guilty of murder in the first degree, and 
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 
20 years to life. 
Sec. 11.15.020. OBSTRUCTING OR INJURING RAILROAD OR 
AIRCRAFT. A person who maliciously (1) places an obstruc­
tion upon a railroad or street railroad, or displaces or 
injures anything appertaining to a railroad or street 
railroad, or does any other act with intent to endanger 
the passage of a locomotive or car, and thereby occasions 
the death of another, or (2) causes or attempts to cause 
�amage or injury to, or places obstruction or explosive
material on, in or about an aircraft, or who commits any
other act with intent to endanger the safety of flight,
operation or passage of an aircraft and thereby occasions
or implements the death of another, is guilty of murde:!'.'
in the fi�st degree, and shall be sentenced to imprison­
ment for not less than 20 years to life.
Sec. 11.15. 0 30. SECOND DEGREE MURDER. Except as 
provided in §§ 10 and 20 of this chapter, a person who 
purposely and maliciously kills another is guilty, of 
murder in the second degree, and shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for a term of not less than 15 years to 
life. 
Sec. 11.15.040. M.ANSLAUGHTER. Except as provided 
in §§ 10 - 30 of this chapter, a person who unlawfully 
kills another is guilty of manslaughter, and is punishable 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than 
one year nor more than 20 years. 
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Sec. 11.15.050. PROCURING ANOTHER TO COM.MIT SELF­
MURDER. A person who purposely and deliberately procures 
another to commit self-murder or assists another in the 
commission of self-murder is guilty of manslaughter, and 
is punishable accordingly. 
Sec. 11.15.070. PHYSICIAN ADMINISTERING POISON OR 
DOING ACT RESULTING IN DEATH WHILE INTOXICATED. A 
physician, or person acting as or pretending to be a 
physician who, while in a state of intoxication, with­
out a design to cause death, administers any poison, 
drug, or medicine, or does another act to a person 
which produces the death of the person, is guilty of 
manslaughter, and is punishable accordingly. 
Sec. 11.15.080. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. Every killing 
of a human being by the culpable negligence of another, 
when the killing is not murder in the first or second 
degree, or is not justifiable or excusable, is man­
slaughter, and is punishable accordingly. 
Sec. 11.15.170. DUELING. A person who fights a 
duel, or is second to a person who fights a duel, or 
challenges another to fight a duel, or accepts a chal­
lenge to fight a duel, or is knowingly the bearer of a 
challenge, or is present at the fighting of a duel as 
aid or surgeon, or advises, encourages, or promotes a 
duel, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for not more than 10 years nor less than one year. 
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ARTICLE 2 - ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Sec. 11.15.140. MAYHEM. A person who, with 
malicious intent to maim or disfigure: (1) cuts, 
bites, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, cuts out 
or disables the tongue, puts out or destroys an 
eye, cuts off or disables a limb or any member of 
another person; or (2) throws or pours upon or 
throws at another person, any scalding hot water, 
vitriol, or other corrosive acid or caustic sub­
stance; or (3) assaults another person with a 
dangerous instrument, is punishable by imprison­
ment in the penitentiary for not more than 20 
years nor less than one year. 
Sec. 11.15.150. SHOOTING, STABBING OR CUTTING 
WITH INTENT TO KILL, WOUND OR MAIM. A person who 
maliciously shoots, stabs, cuts, or shoots at another 
person with intent to kill, wound, or maim him is 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not more than 20 years nor less than one year. 
Sec. 11.15.160. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL 
OR COMMIT RAPE OR ROBBERY. A person who assaults 
another with intent to kill, or to commit rape or 
robbery upon the person assaulted, is punishable 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more 
than 15 years nor less than one year. 
Sec. 11.15.190. ASSAULT WHILE ARMED. A 
person who unlawfully assaults or threatens anothBr 
in a menacing manner, or unlawfully strikes or 
wounds another, having at the time in his posses­
sion a dangerous weapon, with intent to prevent the 
other person from resisting or defending himself, 
is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
10 years nor less than one year, or by a fine of 
not more than $1,000 nor less than $100, or by both. 
Sec. 11.15.200. CARELESS USE OF FIREARMS. (a) 
A person who intentionally, and without malice, points 
or aims a firearm at or toward a person, or discharges 
a firearm so pointed or aimed at a person, or points and 
discharges a firearm at or toward a person or object without 
knowing the identity of the object and maims or injures 
a human being, is guilty of the careless use of fire-
arms, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of 
not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than 
one year, or by both. It an offense specified in this 
section was committed by a person licensed to hunt and 
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was committed while he was hunting, upon conviction, 
the court shall, in addition to the penalty imposed 
in this section, revoke the person's hunting license. 
A person whose license has been revoked may not pur­
chase another hunting license of any class for a period 
of not less than one year nor more than 10 years from 
the date of revocation as determined by the court. If 
an offense specified in this section was committed by 
a person not licensed to hunt and was committed while 
he was hunting, the court shall, in addition to the 
penalty imposed in this section, prohibit the person 
from purchasing any class hunting license for a period 
of not less than one year nor more than 10 years as 
determined by the court. 
(b) If death ensues from the maiming or injuring,
the person discharging the firearm may, in the discre­
tion of the prosecuting officer or grand jury, be 
charged with the crime of manslaughter. 
(c) This section does not apply to a case where
firearms are used in self-defense or in the discharge 
of official duty, or in case of a justifiable homicide. 
Sec. 11.15.210. POISONING. A person who adminis­
ters poison to a person, with intent to kill or injure 
him, or mingles poison with food, drink, or medicine, 
with intent to kill or injure a human being, or wil­
fully poisons a well, spring, cistern, or reservoir 
of water, is punishable by imprisonment in the peni­
tentiary for not more than 15 years nor less than two 
years. 
Sec. 11.15.220. ASSAULT WITH DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
A person armed with a dangerous weapon, who assaults 
another with the weapon, is punishable by imprisonment 
for not more than 10 years nor less than six months, 
or by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than 
$100, or by both. 
Sec. 11.15.225. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. A
person who unlawfully assaults another, or who 
unlawfully strikes or wounds another, and causes 
great bodily injury, is guilty of aggravated assault. 
Upon conviction, a person guilty of aggravated 
assault is punishable by imprisonment for not less 
than six months nor more than five years, or by a 
fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, 
or by both. 
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(b) Under this section, "great bodily injury"
means bodily injury which creates a substantial 
risk of death or which causes serious, permanent 
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of any body member or organ. 
Sec. 11.15.230. ASSAULT AND ASSAULT AND BATTERY. 
A person who unlawfully assaults or threatens another 
in a menacing manner, or unlawfully strikes or wounds 
another, is punishable by a fine of not more than 
$500, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, 
or by both. 
Sec. 11.15.295. USE OF FIREARMS DURING THE 
COMMISSION OF CERTAIN CRIMES. A person who uses or 
carries a firearm during the commission of a robbery, 
assault, murder, rape, burglary, or kidnapping is 
guilty of a felony and upon conviction for a first 
offense is punishable by imprisonment for not less 
than 10 years. Upon conviction for a second or sub­
sequent offense in violation of this section, the 
offender shall be imprisoned for not less than 25 
years. 
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ARTICLE 3 - KIDNAPPING AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Sec. 11.15.260. KIDNAPPING. A person who 
knowlingly and without lawful reason kidnaps, 
abducts or carries away and holds for ransom, 
reward or other unlawful reason another person, 
except in the case of a minor by his parent, is 
punishable by imprisonment for a term of years 
or for life. 
Sec. 11.15.270. CONSPIRACY TO KIDNAP. If 
two or more persons conspire to violate § 260 
of this chapter and one or more of them does any 
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, 
each is punishable by imprisonment for a term 
of years or for life. 
Sec. 11.15.280. RECEIVING, POSSESSING, OR 
DISPOSING OF RANSOM. A person who receives, 
possesses, or disposes of money or other prop­
erty or a portion of it which at any time has 
been delivered as ransom or reward in connection 
with a kidnapping under § 260 of this chapter, 
knowing it to be money or property delivered as 
ransom or reward, is punishable by a fine of not 
more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not 
less than one year nor more than 10 years, or 
by both. 
Sec. 11.15.290. CHILD STEALING. A person 
who maliciously, forcibly or fraudulently takes 
or entices away a child under the age of 12 years, 
in a manner other than as provided in § 260 of 
this chapter, with intent to detain and conceals 
the child from its parent, guardian, or other 
person having the lawful charge of the child, is 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for not more than 10 years not less than six 
months, or by imprisonment in jail for not more 
than one year, or by a fine of not more than 
$500, or by both. 
Sec. 11.15.300. BLACKMAIL. A person who, 
either verbally or by written or printed communication, 
(1) threatens injury to the person or property of
another or to the person and property of a person
standing in the relation of parent or child, husband
or wife, or sister or brother to such other; or (2)
threatens to accuse another of a crime, or of immoral
conduct which, if true, would tend to degrade and
disgrace him or to expose or publish any of his
infirmiti�s or failings; or (3) threatens in any
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way to subject him to the ridicule or contempt of 
society, with intent to extort pecuniary advantage 
or property from him, or with intent to compel him 
to do an act against his will, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than 
five years nor less than six months, or by impri­
sonment in a jail for not more than one year nor 
less than three months. 
Sec. 11. 20. 345. EXTORTION. (a) A person is 
guilty of extortion if he obtains the property of a 
person by threatening to or suggesting that he or 
another may 
(1) inflict bodily injury on anyone, except
under circumstances constituting robbery, or commit 
any other criminal offense; 
(2) accuse anyone of a criminal offense;
(3) expose confidential information or a secret,
whether true or false, tending to subject a person to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impaJ.r his credit 
or business repute; 
(4) take or withhold action as a public official,
or cause a public official to take or withhold action; 
(5) bring about or continue a strike, boycott or
other collective unofficial action, if the property 
is not de�anded or received for the benefit of the 
group in whose interest the person making the threat 
or suggestion purports to act; 
(6) testify or provide information or withhold
testimony or information with respect to a person's 
legal claim or defense; or 
(7) inflict any other harm which would not benefit
the person making the threat or suggestion. 
(b) A person who is convicted of extortion is
punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by 
imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both. 
(c) A threat or suggestion to perform any of the
acts described in (a) of this section includes an offer 
to protect another from any harmful act when the offeror 
has no apparent means to provide the protection or where 
the price asked for rendering the protection service is 
grossly disproportionate to its cost to the offeror. 
(d) It is a defense to prosecution based on (a)
(2), (3) or (4) of this section that the property 
obtained by threat of accusation, exposure, lawsuit 
or other invocation of official action was honestly 
claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm 
done in the circumstances to which the accusation, 
exposure, lawsuit or other official action relates, 
or as compensation for property or lawful services. 
107.
ARTICLE 4 - SEXUAL OFFENSES 
Sec. 11.15.120. RAPE. (a) A person who (1) 
has carnal knowledge of another person, forcibly and 
against the will of the other person, or (2) being 
16 years of age or older, carnally knows and abuses 
a person under 16 years of age, is guilty of rape. 
(b) A person who assists another to force or
compel a third person to engage in a sexual act 
without consent is considered an accomplice to 
rape, irrespective of the legal status of that 
person with respect to the person forced or compelled 
to engage in a sexual act against his will. 
(c) For purposes of this section, the terms
"carnal knowledge" and "sexual act" include sexual, 
oral and anal intercourse, with some penetration, 
however slight. 
Sec. 11.15.130. PUNISHMENT FOR RAPE. (a) A 
person 19 years of age or older convicted of rape 
upon his daughter, son, sister or brother, or upon 
a person under 16 years of age, is punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term of 
years. 
(b) A person less than 19 years of age con­
victed for rape upon his daughter, son, sister or 
brother, or a person under 16 years of age, is 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for 
not more than 20 years. 
(c) A person convicted of rape upon any other
person is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for not more than 20 years nor less than one year. 
Sec. 11.15.134. LEWD OR LASCIVIOUS ACTS TOWARD 
CHILDREN. (a) A person who commits a lewd or 
lascivious act, including an act constituting another 
crime, upon or with the body of a child under 16 years 
of age, intending to arouse, appeal to, or gratify 
his lust, passions, or sexual desires, or the lust, 
passions, or sexual desires of the child is punishable 
by imprisonment for not more than 10 years nor less 
than one year. 
Sec. 11.15.160. ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL 
OR COMMIT RAPE OR ROBBERY. A person who assaults 
another with intent to kill, or to commit rape or 
robbery-upon the person assaulted, is punishable 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more 
than 15 years nor less than one year. 
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Sec. 11.15.230. ASSAULT AND ASSAULT AND BATTERY. 
A person who unlawfully assaults or threatens another 
in a menacing manner, or unlawfully strikes or wounds 
another, is punishable by a fine of not more than 
$500, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, 
or by both. 
Sec. 11.40.010. ADULTERY. A married person 
who voluntarily has sexual intercourse with a person 
other than the offender's husband or wife is guilty 
of adultery, and is punishable by a fine of not more 
than $200, or by imprisonment in a jail for not 
more than three months. 
Sec. 11.40.040. COHABITING IN STATE OF ADULTERY 
OR FORNICATION. A person who cohabits with another 
in a state of adultery or fornication is punishable 
by a fine of not more than $500, or by imprisonment 
in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor 
more than two years or by both. 
Sec. 11.40.080. INDECENT EXPOSURE AND EXHIBITION. 
A person who wilfully and lewdly exposes his person or 
the private parts of his person in a public place, or 
in a place where there are present other persons to 
be offended or annoyed, or who takes part in a model 
artist exhibition, or makes other exhibition of himself 
to public view, or to the view of a number of persons, 
which is offensive to decency, or which is adapted 
to excite vicious or lewd thoughts or acts, upon 
conviction, is punishable by imprisonment in a jail 
for not less than three months nor more than one 
year, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor more 
than $500. 
Sec. 11.40.110. INCEST. A person related to 
another person within and not including the fourth 
degree of consanguinity, computed according to the 
rules of the civil law, who marries or cohabits with 
or has sexual intercourse with that person, knowing 
him to be within that degree of relationship, is 
guilty of incest, and upon conviction is punishable 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than 
three years nor more than 15 years. 
Sec. 11.40.120. SODOMY. A person who commits 
sodomy is, upon conviction, punishable by imprisonment 
for not less than one year nor more than 10 years. 
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APPENDIX IV. 
STATUS OF CRIMINAL CODE REVISION IN OTHER STATES 
I. REVISED CODES: EFFECTIVE DATES: (29) 
ARK. STAT. ANN., TIT.41 (1975); 1/1/1976. 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., TIT. 18 (1973); 7/1/1972. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., TIT. 53a (1972); 10/1/1971. 
DEL. CODE ANN.,TIT. 11 (1975); 7/1/1973. 
'.:',LA. STAT. ANN., TIT. 44 (1975 Cun1. Ann. Pocket Part); 
7/1/1975. 
GA. CODE ANN., TIT. 26 (1972); 7/1/1969. 
HAWAII REV. STAT., TIT. 37; HAWAII SESS. LAWS 1972 
ACTS 9 & 102; 1/1/1973. 
ILL. ANN. STAT., CH. 38, § 1-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972); 1/1/1962. 
ILL. UNIFIED CODE OF CORRECTIONS, ILL. ANN. STAT., 
CH. 38, § 1001-1-1 (Smith-Hurd 1973); 1/1/1973. 
IND. P.L. 148, ACTS OF 1976 (to be codified as IND. CODE, 
TIT. 35); 7/1/1977. 
KAN. STAT. ANN., CH. 21 (1974); 7/1/1970. 
KY. REV. STAT., CH. 500 (1975); 1/1/1975. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN., TIT. 14 (West 1974); 1942. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., TIT. 17-A (Special Pamphlet: 
Criminal Code, 1975); Amended 4/9/1976 (P.L., 
CH. 740 [1976]); 5/1/1976. 
MINN. STAT. ANN., CH. 609 (1964); 9/1/1963. 
MONT. REV. CODES ANN., TIT. 94 (1976 Special Pamphlet); 
1/1/1974. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., TIT. 62 (1974); 11/1/1973. 
N.M. STAT. ANN., CH. 40A (1972); 7/1/1963.
N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1975); 9/1/1967.
N.D. CENT. CODE, TIT. 12.1 (Special Pamphlet:
Criminal Code, 1975); 7/1/1975. 
OHIO REV. CODE, TIT. 29 (1974 Replacement Unit); 1/1/1974. 
ORE. REV. STAT., TIT. 16 (1973 Replacement Part); 1/1/1972. 
PA. STAT. ANN., TIT. 18 (1973); 6/6/1973. 
P.R. PENAL CODE, ACT 115 OF JULY 22, 1974; 1/22/1975. 
S.D. (S.B. 29, enacted 2/26/1976, to be codified as
S.D.C.L., TIT. 22); 4/1/1977.
TEX. PENAL CODE (1974); 1/1/1974. 
UTAH CODE ANN., TIT. 76 (Supp. 1975); 7/1/1973. 
VA. CODE ANN., TIT. 18.2 (1975); 10/1/1975. 
WASH. REV. CODE, § 9A.04.010 (Special Pamphlet: 
Criminal Code, 1975); 7/1/1976. 
WIS. STAT. ANN., TIT. 45 (1958); 7/1/1956. 
110.
II. CURRENT SUBSTANTIVE PENAL CODE REVISION PROJECTS:
A. REVISION COMPLETED: NOT YET ENACTED: (13)
Alabama (Hearings on bill introduced May 1975 held 
during year by Joint Committee of Legislature; 
bill to be reintroduced May 1976) 
Arizona (1975 Final Draft of Revised Criminal Code 
assigned to Special Committees of Legislature for study) 
California (Proposed Criminal Code, S.B. 565, pending 
in Legislature) 
Iowa (S.F. 85 passed by Senate in 1975 as amended; 
passed by House 4/22/1976 with further amendment; 
currently before Senate) 
Maryland (Proposed Code being studied by Special Committee 
of Legislative Council) 
Michigan (Criminal Code Committee has reconvened to 
bring 1967 Michigan Proposed Code up to date for 
resubmission to Legislature) 
Missouri (Proposed Criminal Code reintroduced [S.B. 735) 
in Senate 1976; no action at this session) 
Nebraska (Leg. Bill 623, introduced Jan. 1976 by Judiciary 
Committee, to be reintroduced in 1977 Legislature) 
New Jersey (Proposed Penal Code reintroduced [Assembly 
Bill 642) 2/19/1976 pending in Assembly Committee 
on Judiciary) 
Oklahoma (S.B. 46 in Senate Committee on Criminal 
Jurisprudence) 
South Carolina (S.B. 208, introduced 2/11/1975, pending 
in Senate Judiciary Committee) 
Tennessee (S.B. 600 pending in 1976 legislative session 
but not enacted) 
United States (S. 1 amended and reported to full Committee 
on the Judiciary 10/21/1975) (H.R. 333, introduced 
1/15/1975, H.R. 3907, introduced 2/27/1975, H.R. 
18050, introduced 11/20/1975 & H.R. 12504, introduced 
3/15/1976, pending before Judiciary Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice) 
B. REVISION WELL UNDER WAY: (2)
North Carolina, West Virginia 
C. REVISION AT VARYING PRELIMINARY STAGES (1) 
District of Columbia 
D. CONTEMPLATING REVISIONS: ( 1) 
Rhode Island 
This compilation was prepared by the American Law Institute 
in April 1976. 
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